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Sanford Levinson*
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ABSTRACT
We raise some questions about the timeliness and timelessness
of certain themes in Robert Cover’s masterwork, Justice Accused,
originally published in 1975. Our concern is how the issues Cover
raised when exploring the ways antislavery justices decided fugitive
slave cases in the antebellum United States, played out in the United
States first when Cover was writing nearly fifty years ago, and then
play out in the United States today. The moral-formal dilemma faced
by the justices that Cover studied when adjudicating cases arising from
the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 was whether judicial
decision-makers should interpret the law in light of the antislavery
values of many northern constituencies or instead defer to laws that
reflected the moral values of politicians eager to compromise on
slavery to preserve a bisectional consensus. The moral-formal
dilemma the justices of Cover’s own time faced when adjudicating
cases arising out of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War was
whether they should interpret the law in light of the liberal moral
values of their class, The moral-formal dilemma many contemporary
Americans in institutions far remote from courts are facing is whether
to follow the letter of the law and retain the basic structure of
constitutional law in the United States when doing so threatens to warp
the constitutional fabric, undermine the political regime, and risk an
environmental catastrophe that could easily leave humans near
extinction.
*
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One delight of this symposium is our mutual reengagement
with the extraordinary work of Robert Cover. We pay special attention
to Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, published in
1975—when Cover was only thirty-two.1 This is the work of a
precocious late-twenty-year-old analogous to Schubert quartets
written at a comparable age (or even earlier). Justice Accused is a
brilliant book by any standard. Rereading the text only deepens the
sense of unfathomable loss the academy, and Cover’s numerous
communities, experienced when he was taken from us at such a young
age. He would be only seventy-eight today, leaving us to imagine what
he might have written had he been allowed to reach the age when
scholars write magnum opera. Instead, we must rest content with the
dazzling achievements during his two decades as a member of the legal
academic community.
We raise some questions about Justice Accused, not to criticize
magnificent and audacious scholarship motivated by the most pressing
moral concerns, but to consider the timeliness and timelessness of
certain themes explored in that masterwork. Our concern is how the
issues Cover raised when exploring the ways antislavery Justices
decided fugitive slave cases played out in the antebellum United
States, in the United States when Cover was writing, and in the United
States today. Cover’s opus was a work of the Great Society, even if
the text discusses the American judiciary of more than a century
before.2 He conceived and wrote this project in the immediate
aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement and at the height of the
protests against the Vietnam War. Both events prompted questions
about the interplay between law and morality.3 Americans from
Abraham Lincoln to Martin Luther King considered whether immoral
laws should be viewed as laws at all. They pondered whether, from a
strictly positivist perspective, the most unjust edicts that meet certain
procedural requirements are equal in legal status to the most just
decrees. Are we, as moral agents within the legal community,
1

ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(Yale Univ. Press 1975).
2
For a good discussion of the Great Society, see AMITY SHLAES, THE GREAT
SOCIETY: A NEW HISTORY (Harper Perennial 2019).
3
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (June 6, 1968), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1968/06/06/on-notprosecuting-civil-disobedience.
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obligated to obey those unjust laws, or is civil disobedience justified
when the cause is great enough? 4
These questions raise concerns about all legal systems and
concerns specific to legal systems in particular times and places. Great
minds have pondered the relationship between law and morality.
Thomas Aquinas, almost a millennium ago, insisted that, to be deemed
laws at all edicts must be consistent with God’s will. 5 More than two
millenniums ago, Socrates expounded on the duty of moral agents to
obey unjust laws.6 Henry David Thoreau, almost two hundred years
ago, offered an American rebuttal to Socrates when he went to jail
rather than pay taxes that he believed supported a slaveholding
republic.7 Great thoughts about the relationship between law and
morality, the examples of Socrates and Thoreau indicate, are
frequently, if not always, mediated by the jurisprudential choices
thinkers face in their time and in their regime. The Civil Rights
Movement and Vietnam War presented issues of law and morality
distinctive to the Great Society as well as those grappled with by
ancient Greeks, medieval scholars, and American abolitionists.
The relationship between law and morality is always the
relationship between a particular notion of morality and particular
laws. Civil Rights and Vietnam War protestors objected to specific
legal rules in the name of moral views that were not universally shared
by their contemporaries. Public opinion surveys taken during the
Great Society found distinct cleavages between affluent, well-educated
citizens and poorer, less-educated citizens on fundamental moral
questions.8 Legal elites were particularly likely to hold liberal
See Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois (1838), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 108, 108-15 (Roy
P. Basler ed., 1953). See also Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham
Jail, in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FOUR HUNDRED YEARS OF IDEAS AND
IDEOLOGIES 406, 406-16 (Sue Davis ed., 1996).
5
THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 26
(Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953).
6
See generally THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO: INCLUDING THE LETTERS
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
7
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), reprinted in THE PORTABLE
THOREAU (Carl Bode ed., 1964).
8
HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 243-44 (1983) [hereinafter
DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE]; Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in
American Politics, 58 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV. 364-65 (1964) [hereinafter Consensus
and Ideology].
4
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opinions on civil rights and liberties typical of affluent, well-educated
citizens.9 Meanwhile, the moral values that inspired civil disobedience
to protest Jim Crow were shared by African-Americans who had been
enslaved and then oppressed throughout American history and liberal
activists, many of whom came from very privileged families. The
relationship between law and morality in Cover’s time was the
relationship between the morality of liberal conceptions of equality
and laws that had previously been interpreted as sanctioning a caste
system in the United States under the guise of federalism. 10
The sharp divide between white elites who supported liberal
racial equality, a white proletariat in the north who were ambivalent,
and a white population in the south committed to Jim Crow played
important roles when an almost entirely affluent, highly educated,
white male judiciary during the 1960s and 1970s considered what
Cover described as “the moral-formal dilemma.”11 This dilemma
occurs when Justices consider whether “moral values . . . outweigh[]
interests and values served by fidelity to the formal system when such
values seem[] to block direct application of the moral or natural law
propositions.”12
When adjudicating cases arising from the Fugitive Slave Acts
of 179313 and 1850,14 the Justices Cover studied faced the moralformal dilemma of whether judicial decision-makers should interpret
the law in light of the antislavery values of many northern
constituencies or defer to laws that reflected the moral values of
politicians eager to compromise on slavery to preserve a bisectional
consensus. That consensus, as Kermit (“Kim”) Roosevelt suggests,
regarded the most pressing constitutional commitment to maintain a
national union that recognized the legitimacy of slavery in states where
slavery was lawful and the concomitant duty of “free” states to return
fugitives escaping bondage in their “home” state. 15 When adjudicating
cases arising out of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War,
Justices of Cover’s time faced the moral-formal dilemma of whether
they should interpret the law in light of the moral values of their class.
9

See Consensus and Ideology, supra note 6, at 247.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11
COVER, supra note 1, at 199.
12
Id. at 197.
13
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 STAT. 302 (1793) (repealed 1864).
14
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 STAT. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864).
15
See generally KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE NATION THAT NEVER WAS:
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICA’S STORY (forthcoming Apr. 2022).
10
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Strong class divisions emerged during the 1960s over the Vietnam
War. For example, Justices might write into law the values typical of
an increasing number of their fellow affluent, highly educated
Americans who, during the early 1970s, regarded the conflict in
southeast Asia as exemplifying American imperialism. 16
Alternatively, they could defer to laws that reflected the moral values
of less affluent citizens, many of whom accepted the official narrative
that the United States was either assisting an oppressed group abroad
or engaging in a fight against the spread of communism that threatened
human flourishing across the globe. 17
Times change. The Great Society is over. The most powerful
political movement of the present regards white men as the main
victims of discrimination. 18 Wars as unsuccessful as Vietnam go
largely unprotested, perhaps because they are fought by poor
volunteers, few of whom even aspire to upper-middle class status.19
Courts are no longer what Ronald Dworkin labeled the “forum of
principle”20 in which liberal, better educated, and more affluent
citizens could make their constitutional visions the official law of the
land.21 Most Americans now regard the federal judiciary as just
another site for ordinary politics.22 Appointments to the judiciary are
viewed as just another spoil attached to winning elections, even as
Justices traverse the country giving unconvincing speeches
proclaiming that the Supreme Court is staffed by the only nine persons
in the United States unswayed by ideological and partisan

16

See William L. Lunch & Peter W. Sperlich, American Public Opinion and the War
in Vietnam, 32 W. POL. Q. 21, 38 (1979) (noting sharply diminished support for the
war in Vietnam about persons who had attended graduate school).
17
Id.
18
Charles M. Blow, White Male Victimization Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/trump-white-malevictimization.html.
19
Jacob Weisberg, Rough Draft, SLATE (Mar. 22, 2006), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2006/03/the-gross-unfairness-of-an-all-volunteer-army.html.
20
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
21
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789-2020
(2021).
22
See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Job Approval Rating Dipped Over Last Year,
Poll
Finds,
WASH.
POST
(July
28,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-approvalgallup/2021/07/27/a1f9e4a6-ef24-11eb-81d2-ffae0f931b8f_story.html.
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considerations.23 Political liberals regularly rail against the Supreme
Court, with a six-justice majority of conservative Republican Justices
who are rolling back major liberal accomplishments such as the Voting
Rights Act of 196524 and any significant protection of reproductive
rights for women.25 The most recent polling data indicates that only a
slim majority of Americans now “approve” of the Court; however, that
54% figure is only reached because roughly two-thirds of the
Republicans sampled like the current Court. 26
As times change, so does the moral-formal dilemma. The Civil
Rights Movement and the anti-War movement, at least as viewed by
the academy in the 1960s, presented the moral-formal dilemma in pure
form. Jim Crow laws were unjust. Young men were being drafted to
fight an immoral war, kill those who some considered “freedom
fighters,” and risk their lives for an unworthy cause. 27 Restrictions on
civil rights marches, anti-war protests, and draft resistance were
unconstitutional efforts to stymie efforts at greater racial equality or
attempts to block American participation in a disastrous war. Every
respectable ethicist and every decent lawyer, at least as defined by the
bulk of the academy, understood that morality and law were opposed. 28
See Joan Biskupic, Stephen Breyer Worries About Supreme Court’s Public
Standing
in
Current
Political
Era,
CNN
(Apr.
6,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/06/politics/stephen-breyer-harvardspeech/index.html; Chandelis Duster, Justice Amy Coney Barrett Says Supreme
Court is ‘Not a Bunch of Partisan Hacks, CNN (Sept. 13, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/13/politics/amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-notpartisan/index.html; Ariane de Vogue, Justice Samuel Alito Says Supreme Court is
Not
a
‘Dangerous
Cabal,
CNN
(Sept.
30,
2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/30/politics/samuel-alito-notre-dame/index.html.
24
Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
25
See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021); Whole
Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
26
Public Views of the Supreme Court Turned More Negative Before News of Breyers
Retirement,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Feb.
2,
2022),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/02/02/publics-views-of-supreme-courtturned-more-negative-before-news-of-breyers-retirement.
27
See Philip Converse & Howard Schuman, Silent Majorities and the Vietnam War,
222 SCI. AM. 17, 25 (1970) (noting greater tendency of those who attended elite
universities to oppose the Vietnam War).
28
See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1973). This
is almost certainly true concerning support for the Civil Rights Movement, even if
Robert Bork stood out for his denunciation of the public accommodations section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964—calling them an “evil” that trenched on the protected
liberty interests of business owners to accord service only to those they wished to
serve. Robert H. Bork, Civil Rights—A Challenge, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963,
23
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The sole question in the academy was whether laws widely agreed to
be immoral should be respected and obeyed.
In polarized times, this elite consensus disappears. One feature
of much contemporary civil disobedience—consider illegal protests at
abortion clinics or a public willingness to disobey state bans on
abortion—is that the moral debate is marked by good faith
disagreement on both sides. Morally decent people disagree on the
morality of terminating a pregnancy. Activists on both sides find both
the “Scalia” compromise29 and the Casey compromise30 to be
unattractive. Pro-choice and pro-life activists in this environment face
the same moral-formal dilemma. Proponents and opponents of legal
abortion must decide the extent to which the Constitution reflects the
values they cherish. They must then determine whether they have
obligations to respect the Constitution or official decisions interpreting
the Constitution that either fail to protect all women from exercising
their fundamental right to reproductive choice or fail to prevent the
wholesale slaughter of the unborn.
Constitutional times cycle. 31
Donald Trump and the
contemporary Republican party may be providing Americans with a
new variation on the moral-formal dilemma grappled with by
nineteenth century Justices in fugitive slave cases and twentieth
century Justices in civil rights cases. Broad agreements exist among
the intelligentsia that Donald Trump lacked any of the qualities
at 21, 23. The Vietnam War was more complex. Major architects of the movement
included distinguished academics such as McGeorge Bundy, the former Dean of the
Faculty at Harvard and M.I.T.’s Walt Rostow. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945) [hereinafter The Japanese
American Cases] (Former Yale Dean Eugene Rostow (Walt’s brother), a committed
proponent of racial justice, also actively supported the War.); Eugene V. Rostow,
Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833 (1972)
[hereinafter Great Cases Make Bad Law] (That being said, most students of Cover’s
generation were distinctly antagonistic to the War and firmly rejected the
“leadership” of such elders as Bork or the Rostows.).
29
Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). This is an approach that leaves each state
free to determine how abortion should be regulated.
30
Id. at 869-79 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.); id. at 920-22
(Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); id. at 926 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). This approach makes abortion legal
throughout the nation, but heavily regulated in ways that impose what many view as
“undue burdens” on vulnerable women.
31
See generally JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2021).
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necessary in a president32 and that the Republican Party has gone off
the constitutional democracy rails. 33 Nevertheless, following the
pattern of autocratic “wannabees” across the globe, Trump and
Republicans often rely on democratic forms when seeking to subvert
American democracy. 34 The moral-formal dilemma many Americans
in institutions far remote from courts are facing is whether to follow
the letter of the law and retain the basic structure of constitutional law
in the United States 35 even when doing so threatens to warp the
constitutional fabric, undermine the political regime, and risk an
environmental catastrophe that could easily leave humans near
extinction.36
I.

THE MORAL-FORMAL DILEMMA: 1850

Bob (Cover), whom both of us were privileged to know
slightly37 did not stress civil disobedience by civilians, regardless of
how important that concern was to the body politic at the time. He did
not focus substantial attention on the abolitionists many scholars claim
provided the intellectual underpinnings for the post-Civil War
32

See Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of AntiPublian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order,
21 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 140-45 (2018).
33
See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN
IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2016).
34
For the memorandum from Trump’s attorney, John Eastman, to then Vice
President Mike Pence instructing him on what actions to take on January 6, 2021 so
that Trump could “legally” overturn the 2020 presidential election, see Trump
Lawyer’s Memo on Six-Step Plan for Pence to Overturn the Election, CNN POL.
(Sep. 21, 2021, 8:20 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/21/politics/read-eastmanmemo/index.html. See, e.g., ROSALIND DIXON & DAVID LANDAU, ABUSIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL BORROWING: LEGAL GLOBALIZATION AND THE SUBVERSION OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2021); Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI.
L. REV. 545 (2018).
35
See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT)
(Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (discussing what Levinson believes to be the baneful
consequences of following the letter of the political structures outlined in the
Constitution of the United States).
36
See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 UNIV. PA. L.
REV. 707, 729-38 (2009) (noting “excessive fidelity” may cause constitutional
crises).
37
Levinson primarily through the aegis of the Shalom Hartman Institute of Jewish
Philosophy in Jerusalem, and Graber through the aegis of Yale Hillel in New Haven.
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Amendments.38 Instead, Cover directed a laser-like focus on the
distinctive obligations and conduct of a particular group of American
judges, including members of the United States Supreme Court. These
Justices sat during the early national and Jacksonian eras, 39 which
many scholars maintain created a constitutional order distinct from the
regime inaugurated in 1789. 40 Cover did not write about a random
sample of judicial actors. The subjects of Justice Accused are what
social scientists call a “stratified sample.” 41 All were “anti-slavery”
men who publicly manifested, in one way or another, their abhorrence
of human bondage as a practice. 42 Cover’s interest laid in the tension
between his subjects’ opposition to slavery and their commitment to
maintaining the law of the land that appeared to condone slavery. 43
Cover’s different treatment of John Marshall, Roger Taney,
and Joseph Story, the leading figures with James Kent in American
constitutional law prior to the Civil War, illustrates his selection bias.
Marshall and Taney play only very minor roles. Marshall was a willing
participant in the practice of enslaving others. Paul Finkelman recently
demonstrated that Marshall owned, bought, and sold enslaved
persons.44 Happily embedded in “the peculiar institution,”45 the “Great
38

See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT & EVAN D. BERNICK, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: ITS LETTER AND SPIRIT (2021); WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE (1998); JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Howard J. Graham, The Early Antislavery
Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 50 WIS. L. REV. 131 (1950).
39

The early national period is conventionally understood to have run from the
ratification of the 1787 Constitution to the 1820s. The Jacksonian Era is
conventionally understood to have run from the 1820s until the Civil War. See, e.g.,
1 HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 93-231 (3d ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2022).
40
See, e.g., GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007); GERALD LEONARD & SAUL
CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S-1830S (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019)
(arguing that a regime emphasizing herrenvolk democracy based on white supremacy
had become nationally triumphant).
41
See Monroe G. Sirken, Stratified Sample Surveys with Multiplicity, 67 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 224 (1972).
42
See generally COVER, supra note 1.
43
Id.
44
PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION'S HIGHEST
COURT 31 (Harv. Univ. Press 2018).
45
Id. at 3.
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Chief Justice”46 no more experienced a moral-formal dilemma when
adjudicating slavery issues than did the slaveholding enthusiast, North
Carolina Justice Thomas Ruffin, who wrote the most unequivocal and
unsparing delineation of the legal meaning of being an enslaved person
in State v. Mann.47 Marshall’s discussion in The Antelope of victims
of the international slave trade, which Congress banned for American
citizens but was still legal when engaged in by the nationals of other
countries, distinguishes between the roles of the “jurist” and the
“moralist.” Only one conclusion is possible for the conscientious
“jurist.”48 Nothing in Marshall’s history indicates any identification
with the moralist opposed to human bondage. Whatever feelings
Marshall had about the rigors of legal fidelity, the Virginia slaveholder,
in slave cases, felt none of the psychological and emotional tension—
what Cover, in Justice Accused, labels “dissonance.”49
Taney’s infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford50 exhibits
the same Marshallian sensibilities on slavery. 51 Taney insisted that
Justices should be guided by the law rather than by cotemporaneous
morality.52 But the decision Jackson’s Chief Justice made with respect
to the citizenship status of free Blacks and the right to bring slaves into
American territories was consistent with the racist and pro-Southern
sentiments Taney expressed throughout his career. 53 Marshall and
Taney may have occasionally written what appear to be anti-slavery
sentences.54 So did Thomas Jefferson.55 None of these towering
46

Id. at 27.
13 N.C. 263, 264-68 (1829). See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003). For
several North Carolina Law Review articles from a March 2009 symposium detailing
Ruffin’s active participation in slavery, see Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin
and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C.L. REV. 757 (2009); Laura F. Edwards, The
Forgotten Legal World of Thomas Ruffin: The Power of Presentism in the History of
Slave Law, 87 N.C.L. REV. 855 (2009); Sally Greene, State v. Mann Exhumed, 87
N.C.L. REV. 702 (2009); James A. Wynn, Jr., State v. Mann: Judicial Choice or
Judicial Duty, 87 N.C.L. REV. 991 (2009).
48
Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 121-22 (1825).
49
COVER, supra note 1, at 227-38.
50
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
51
Id. at 399-454.
52
Id. at 426.
53
MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 82
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
54
See, e.g., FINKELMAN, supra note 44, at 7-8; Antelope, 23 U.S. at 120.
55
See, THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, reprinted in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 235, 238-39 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
47
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figures in American constitutionalism ever acted as if they were
committed to incorporating these critiques into the official
constitutional law of the land.56
Cover’s Justices were not personally entwined with human
bondage; they condemned that practice. In fact, many had connections
with prominent abolitionists. Joseph Story is a central figure in Justice
Accused.57 Unlike Marshall or Taney, the Massachusetts Justice had
no illusions about the reality of chattel slavery. In United States v. La
Jeune Eugenie,58 Story, sitting as a circuit judge, declared with great
passion and at considerable length that the international slave trade
necessarily carries with it a breach of all the moral
duties, of all the maxims of justice, mercy and
humanity, and of the admitted rights, which
independent Christian nations now hold sacred in their
intercourse with each other. What is the fact as to the
ordinary, nay, necessary course, of this trade? It begins
in corruption, and plunder, and kidnapping. It creates
and stimulates unholy wars for the purpose of making
captives. It desolates whole villages and provinces for
the purpose of seizing the young, the feeble, the
defenceless, and the innocent. It breaks down all the ties
of parent, and children, and family, and country. It shuts
up all sympathy for human suffering and sorrows. It
manacles the inoffensive females and the starving
infants. It forces the brave to untimely death in defence
of their humble homes and firesides or drives them to
despair and self-immolation. It stirs up the worst
passions of the human soul, darkening the spirit of
revenge, sharpening the greediness of avarice,
brutalizing the selfish, envenoming the cruel, famishing
the weak, and crushing to death the broken-hearted.
This is but the beginning of the evils. Before the
unhappy captives arrive at the destined market, where
the traffic ends, one quarter part at least in the ordinary
course of events perish in cold blood under the
See Paul Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: “Treason Against the Hopes of the
World,” in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181-82 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993); FINKELMAN,
supra note 44, at 26-111, 172-218.
57
See COVER, supra note 1, at 238-43.
58
26 F. Cas. 832, 845-46 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
56
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inhuman, or thoughtless treatment of their oppressors.
Strong as these expressions may seem, and dark as is
the colouring of this statement, it is short of the real
calamities inflicted by this traffic. All the wars, that
have desolated Africa for the last three centuries, have
had their origin in the slave trade. The blood of
thousands of her miserable children has stained her
shores, or quenched the dying embers of her desolated
towns, to glut the appetite of slave dealers. The ocean
has received in its deep and silent bosom thousands
more, who have perished from disease and want during
their passage from their native homes to the foreign
colonies. I speak not from vague rumours, or idle tales,
but from authentic documents, and the known historical
details of the traffic, — a traffic, that carries away at
least 50,000 persons annually from their homes and
their families, and breaks the hearts, and buries the
hopes, and extinguishes the happiness of more than
double that number.59
Milder, but still thoroughly heartfelt according to the evidence, was
Story’s colleague John McLean, another subject of Justice Accused.60
McLean, who was seeking the Free Soil Party’s presidential
nomination and would later seek the Republican Party’s nomination
for the presidency,61 commented when charging an Ohio jury in his
capacity as a circuit judge that slavery “is admitted, by almost all who
have examined the subject, to be founded in wrong, in oppression, in
power against right.”62
The comments quoted above did not explain or justify Story’s
or McLean’s votes in most fugitive slave cases. In 1842, the year of
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,63 Story wrote to a friend, “You know full well
that I have ever been opposed to slavery. But I take my standard of

59

Id. at 845-46.
See COVER, supra note 1, at 243-49.
61
See Rachel Shelden, The Availability of John McLean: Presidential Politics and
Slavery on the Supreme Court (Feb. 25, 2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
62
COVER, supra note 1, at 246.
63
41 U.S. 539 (1842).
60
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duty as a judge from the Constitution.”64 Prigg was on point. As Story
indicated, a deal is a deal. The price of the Constitution was paid by
accommodations for slavery. The Fugitive Slave Clause, Story wrote,
“constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the
Union could not have been formed.” 65 That was the Constitution to
which he had sworn a solemn oath of obedience. Like Donald
Rumsfeld’s later comment about wars and armies, judges must be
faithful to the Constitution they swore loyalty to, not to a fictive
constitution they might have preferred. 66
One can hardly read Prigg without recognizing that Story
believed, not fancifully, that the survival of the Union was at stake.
Some abolitionists called for “No Union with Slaveholders,”67 but they
were not relevant politically.68 Far more important were similar
rumblings of disunion emanating from South Carolina. 69 The
realization of that vision was only eighteen years away. Story scorned
the uncouth Andrew Jackson, but he (and Daniel Webster) shared the
former President’s commitment to preventing conflicts over slavery
from disrupting the national union. 70 Preserving the Union was the
most compelling of interests, the satisfaction of which demanded what
would otherwise be objectionable, or even “rotten,” compromises. 71
McLean, in Prigg, dissented from Story’s arguably tendentious
reading of what the Constitution commanded in fugitive slave cases,
but the Ohio jurist shared Story’s commitment to maintaining fidelity
64

COVER, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting Letter from Joseph Story to Ezekiel Bacon
(Nov. 19, 1842), in LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW AT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY 430, 431 (William W. Story ed., 1851)).
65
See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 611.
66
Helmut Sonnenfeldt & Ron Nessen, You Go to War with the Press You Have,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 30, 2004), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/you-go-to-warwith-the-press-you-have (“As you know, you go to war with the Army you have.
They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”).
67
See HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 326 (St. Martin’s Griffin 1998).
68
See FORREST A. NABORS, FROM OLIGARCHY TO REPUBLICANISM: THE GREAT
TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION 128-29 (Univ. Mo. Press 2017).
69
See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY
1776-1854 211-86 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
70
See GERALD T. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 304-06 (Simon & Schuster 1970).
71
See AVISHAI MARGALIT, ON COMPROMISE AND ROTTEN COMPROMISES 55 (2009)
(discussing slavery as a rotten compromise the Union made).
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to law when law clashed with morality. 72 Much like his successors,
McLean maintained that the constitutional text or precedents handed
down by earlier Courts were the sole guides for judicial decision
making. To look to moral values not embedded in these legal materials
was the equivalent of civil disobedience by judges who were bound by
oath not to engage in civil disobedience. On the ground of judicial
duty, McLean fully, even if not cheerfully, enforced the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850,73 which was even more iniquitous than the 1793 law. 74
His 1853 opinion on circuit in Miller v. McQuerry75 echoed Justice
James Iredell’s concurrence in Calder v. Bull,76 which viewed any
reliance on “natural law” or “natural rights” as dangerous in a world
where there was simply insufficient agreement on what these terms
really meant concretely. 77 McLean insisted that “judges cannot
explore”78 such questions as natural law and right, which might
certainly counsel against legitimizing slavery. 79 “With the abstract
principles of slavery,” the Ohio jurist wrote, “courts called to
administer this law have nothing to do. It is for the people, who are
sovereign, and their representatives, in making constitutions, and in the
enactment of laws, to consider the laws of nature, and the immutable
principles of right.”80 Judges “look to the law and to the law only. A
disregard of this, by the judicial powers, would undermine and
overturn the social compact”81 that depended on public officials
72

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 658-74 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting).
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864). The Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850 established and empowered federal “commissioners” to order the
“rendering” of alleged fugitives back to their purported home state. Id. at 462-63.
The magistrates were paid $5 if they found in the alleged fugitives favor, but received
$10 if they accepted the slave-catcher’s assertions as to the identity of the alleged
fugitive. Id. at 463. Section 7 of the act prohibited “any person” from “willingly
obstruct[ing], hinder[ing], or prevent[ing]” the return of a fugitive. Id. at 464. This
included “harbor[ing] or conceal[ing]” a fugitive in order to “prevent the discovery
and arrest of such person.” Id. Those found guilty in a federal court of violating the
Act were “subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment
not exceeding six months.” Id.
74
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 1 STAT. 302 (repealed 1864). The 1793 act capped
the potential fine at $500 and imprisonment not to exceed one year. Id. at 302.
75
17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853).
76
3 U.S. 386 (1798).
77
Id. at 398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring).
78
Id. at 339.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
73
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adhering to whatever deals the framers made in 1787 and
implementing subsequently enacted laws passed under the terms set
out in the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The social realities of the moral-formal dilemma that Story and
his fellow judges on the state and federal benches faced in the years
before the Civil War were not truly analogous to the moral-formal
dilemma that the civil rights movement presented to Justices on the
Warren and Burger Courts. Story revered Chief Justice Marshall and
had good relationships with other politically active slaveholding
southerners.82 Prominent slaveholders, from Story’s perspective, were
wrong about slavery, but they were wrong about slavery in the way
each of the authors of this essay think the other author is wrong about
the need for fundamental textual constitutional reform.83 Decent
people make good-faith mistakes about moral and constitutional
matters all the time. Not to share civic space with people who hold
mistaken moral beliefs means one will wind up in a country of one,
which may have been Thoreau’s ideal. 84 Story’s attitude towards
slaveowners reflects then-Senator Joseph Biden’s attitude toward
segregationists when he first joined Congress.85
Southern
representatives were people you could make deals with, even if they
were terribly wrong on racial matters. 86
Most readers of Justice Accused were not so tolerant. They
regarded such claims as “the Smiths are really good people, even if
they own slaves or are white supremacists,” as the moral equivalent of
statements like “the Smiths are really good people, even if they are
Nazis bent on exterminating Jews” or the actions of silent critics of
Nazis who nonetheless are more than willing to betray Jews-in-hiding,
like Anne Frank—perhaps an analogue in some way to a fugitive slave.
Some Northern liberals celebrated the devoted segregationist North

82

See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 4344, 54, 262 (1971).
83
See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 35; Mark A. Graber, Running Cars, Constitutions
and Metaphors into the Ground, 18 GOOD SOC’Y 35 (2009).
84
See THOREAU, supra note 7, at 121 (“[A]ny man more right than his neighbors
constitutes a majority of one . . . .”).
85
See Marcus Witcher, Why Joe Biden Had to Work with Segregationists, WASH.
POST (June 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/28/whyjoe-biden-was-right-work-with-segregationists.
86
Id.
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Carolina Senator Sam Ervin’s efforts to bring down Richard Nixon. 87
Nevertheless, no one who supported Martin Luther King
wholeheartedly venerated proponents of Jim Crow in the way Story
wholeheartedly venerated Marshall. The moral formal-dilemma that
the civil rights movement raised was the relationship between the law
and evil, not the relationship between the law and good-faith moral
errors—or even between the law and moral blindness.
II.

THE SOVEREIGNTY DILEMMA: ARE WE ONE?

The moral-formal dilemma is one aspect of what we might
refer to as the “sovereignty dilemma.” If one recognizes the presence
of a sovereign authorized to issue binding commandments, then on
occasion that sovereign will almost certainly command what one
believes is unjust. The principle “the king can do no wrong” legally
controls when the law and morality clash. As Thomas Hobbes argued,
the whole point of a sovereign is to bring arguments about justice to an
end by establishing an authority vested with the power to make
performative utterances that offer dispositive resolutions to ethical
quandaries.88 One need not read Hobbes to be informed about this
sovereign power. A central episode in the Bible is the Akeda, the
binding of Isaac.89 God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son, a
commandment that Abraham is altogether willing to obey even if, at
the last moment, a ram suddenly appears to take the place of Isaac. 90
God, as sovereign, Abraham acknowledges, could legally do no
wrong, even when his edicts are unfathomable. 91 The ways of the
sovereign may be beyond human understanding, but that does not
make them less binding. This version of the moral-formal dilemma
was quite familiar to Bob Cover, who was noteworthy for being one of
the first major professors at an elite law school to draw heavily from
Jewish materials for his scholarship. 92
87

See James R. Dickson, Sen. Sam Ervin, Key Figure in Watergate Probe, Dies,
WASH. POST
(Apr.
24, 1985),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/longterm/watergate/stories/ervinobit.htm.
88
See SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN
WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 214-56 (2016).
89
Genesis 22:1-19.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-13, 19-23
(1983).
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Hovering over any modern discussion of the Akeda is the
Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard and his notion of the
“teleological suspension of the ethical.” 93 Kierkegaard discussed the
willingness to suspend “ordinary” ethical norms, including the
teachings of “natural law” or “right reason,” in favor of the overriding
“teleological duty” to obey the sovereign’s commands.94 If one is a
certain kind of revolutionary, the “teleological suspension of the
ethical” refers as well to the power of the immanent commands of the
historical zeitgeist. 95 For the religious, the sovereign is God. The
original basis of much political authority was “Divine right.” Rulers
were chosen by God. Kings were expected to obey God, just as the
people were expected to obey their rulers—no questions asked. Saul’s
loss of monarchical authority was directly traceable to his apparent
unwillingness to carry out the Divine commandment to slay Agog, the
Amalekite king.96
The actual command given to Saul regarding the fate of the
Amalekites was, “Now, go and strike down Amalek, and put under
the ban everything that he has, you shall not spare him, and you shall
put to death man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel
and donkey.”97 Robert Alter in his commentary on Kings I observes
that “[t]he ‘ban’ . . . one of the cruelest practices of ancient Near
Eastern warfare, is an injunction of total destruction—of all living
things—of the enemy.”98 Perhaps because of Alter’s qualms about
such a genocidal order, he notes that “there is at least some margin of
ambiguity as to whether the real source of this ferocious imperative is
God or the [false?] prophet [Samuel] who claims to speak on His
behalf.”99 Still, whatever the answer to that question, God is reported
to “repent that I made Saul king, for he has turned back from Me, and
My words [to commit genocide] he has not fulfilled.”100 The divine
93

SOREN KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING AND THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH 67
(Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1941).
94
Id. at 64-77.
95
For a withering analysis of such submission to historical “necessity,” see generally
ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL: AN ESSAY ON MAN IN REVOLT (Vintage Books 1956).
96
See 1 Samuel 15, in 2 THE HEBREW BIBLE: PROPHETS 234, 234-39 (Robert Alter
trans., 2019).
97
Id. at 15:3, 234 (emphasis added). God “repents” of his having named the
obviously squishy Saul as king. Id. at 15:10-11, 234.
98
Id. at 235 n.3.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 15:11, 234.
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sovereign apparently demands absolute commitment to formal divine
law, even when that law defies any reasonable human notion of
morality. The New Testament echoes the Hebrew Bible on divine
sovereignty. Saul of Tarsus, or Saint Paul, in his Letter to the Romans,
crisply writes, “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities,
for there is no authority except that which God has established. The
authorities that exist have been established by God.” 101
The discovery, population, and creation of new countries in the
New World took place when the locus of sovereignty was shifting.
During the sixteenth century, Thomas More, a devout Catholic,
suffered death by remaining loyal to Rome and papal sovereignty when
rejecting Henry VIII’s claim to regal sovereign authority. 102 As Hilary
Mantel emphasizes in her historical-fiction study of that period, More
was not hesitant to demand the lives of those he deemed heretics
against the teachings of Rome. 103 He died for his beliefs in papal
sovereignty, just as he had put to death others who dared to locate
sovereignty elsewhere. 104 By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
More’s assertions of papal sovereignty, Henry VIII’s assertions of
regal sovereignty, and all other variations on divine sovereignty were
widely discredited. 105 By 1800, especially in the United States, the
controversy between More and Henry VIII was anachronistic.
“Popular sovereignty,” which might be described as the
unbridled rule by the people, had replaced divine sovereignty, whether
understood as the rule of Rome or the rule of kings. 106 For some, the
“voice of the people” was equivalent to “the voice of God.”107 “Vox
populi, vox Dei” (the voice of the people is the voice of God) captured
the new sovereignty, 108 even as that expression was originally used
sarcastically to criticize the chutzpah109 involved in substituting mere
101

Romans 13:1.
See WILL DURANT, THE REFORMATION 555-58 (MJF Books 1957).
103
See generally Hilary Mantel, Wolf Hall (2009).
104
Id.
105
For the rise of popular sovereignty, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1988).
106
See generally id.
107
Id. at 13.
108
See Christian G. Fritz, Out from Under the Shadow of the Federal Constitution,
41 RUTGERS L.J. 851, 852 (2010).
109
See Chutzpah, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chutzpah (defining
“chutzpah” as “the quality of audacity for good or for bad”) (last visited Feb. 19,
2022); LEO ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF YINGLISH 117-20 (McGraw-Hill Publ’g Co. 1989).
102
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human beings for God as the source of authority. 110 For many students
or devotees of the Constitution of the United States, both in the
eighteenth and twenty-first centuries, the basis of constitutional
authority was “ordination” by “We the People.” 111 The first Federalist
declares, “it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country,
by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice . . . .”112
Oaths of office, which are quite prominent in the text of the
Constitution,113 signify this willingness to submit oneself to the will of
the people, assuming what the people had commanded may be
ascertained. Now-Congressman Jamie Raskin captured the inversion
of sovereign authority when, as a Maryland state legislator protesting
religious demands for bans on same-sex marriage, he observed that
when taking office, he had put his hand on the Bible to swear
allegiance to the Constitution; he did not put his hand on the
Constitution to swear allegiance to the Bible. 114
Popular sovereignty is the foundation of most contemporary
American theories of “constitutional interpretation,” which eschew

See also Max Stearns, Liberty, Civilization, and COVUD Chutzpah, blindspotblog.us
(Aug. 30, 20201), https://www.blindspotblog.us/post/covid-liberty-and-chutzspah
(”Chutzpah is a Yiddish word that some claim can't really be defined. The classic
example involves a child who, after murdering his parents, pleads for clemency on
the grounds of being an orphan”).
110
See James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of
Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 131 (2000).
111
See MORGAN, supra note 105, at 283.
112
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
113
For the presidential oath in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST. art. II. For the
requirement that all public officials pledge fealty to the Constitution, see U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
114
Emotions Flare Over Same-Sex Marriage, BALT. SUN: CAP. NOTEBOOK (Mar. 2,
2006),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2006-03-02-0603020182story.html. William J. Brennan, in his confirmation hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, stated that he could not imagine that his fidelity to the
Constitution would conflict with his duties as a Catholic; however, he assured the
senators that, should such a conflict occur, his oath to support, protect, and defend
the Constitution would take precedence. Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
1047, 1062-63 (1990). At least one critic described this as “idolatry.” Id. at 1066
n.64.
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natural law for positivism. 115 We may argue about the “proper
interpretation” of the People’s will, but finding arguments that the
ascertainable will should be ignored in favor of some other value,
including adherence to a morality that has been rejected by the relevant
“people,” is rare. Even Ronald Dworkin, who emphasized overarching
“principles” as central to proper legal interpretation, rejected the
universalistic commitments of classical “natural law.”116 Dworkin’s
principles made the Constitution “the best it could be” which was
different from the best overall polity. 117 If a fundamental principle of
American constitutionalism was the priority of the Union and,
therefore, the necessity to enforce a “rotten compromise” vis-à-vis
slavery in order to do so,118 then Dworkians might behave as did the
justices Cover studied. Story and McLean rested their constitutionally
pro-slavery arguments on the foundations and principles established
by the “vox populi” when defending positions they “knew” to be
subject to devastating moral criticism.119
The Constitution
commanded that slavery be protected. Kierkegaard would have
understood their behavior all too well.

115

RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY
AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). Barnett’s book is the exception that
proves the rule. Barnett explicitly criticizes “democratic” theories of interpretation
for ignoring the teachings of natural law and natural right. Id. at 22-26. Barnett is a
prominent devotee of “originalism” in the contemporary legal academy, which is a
relentlessly positivist theory of interpretation. Perhaps as a result, he is also devoted
to demonstrating that those scholars who agree with William Lloyd Garrison
mistakenly believe that the Constitution is a “covenant with death and an agreement
with hell” concerning slavery. See BARNETT & BERNICK, supra note 38, at 89-93.
He can be credited with “rediscovering” Lysander Spooner and touting his theory
that the Constitution, correctly understood, was anti-slavery. Id. at 91-93. Cover’s
one reference to Spooner described him as “utopian.” COVER, supra note 1, at 154.
He did not take Spooner seriously as a proper entry point to constitutional
interpretation.
116
See Kenneth Einar Himma, Situating Dworkin: The Logical Space Between Legal
Positivism and Natural Law Theory, 27 OKLA. CITY UNIV. L. REV. 41, 95-107
(2002).
117
James E. Fleming, Fit, Justification, and Fidelity, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1283, 1292
(2013) (paraphrasing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (Harv. Univ. Press
1986)).
118
MARGALIT, supra note 71, at 55-57.
119
See, e.g., DUNNE, supra note 70, at 401-02.
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The vox populi, vox dei, and Judaism are structured by dubious
assertions of unity: “We are one.”120 The constant refrain in the Jewish
community that “we are one” is belied by substantial disagreements
between more-orthodox and reform Jews over almost every current
political issue, not to mention basic theological differences between
the various branches of Judaism. Although “we are one” is often used
when Jews are called to support Israel, when Israel was first
established in 1948, many Orthodox Jews withheld their support out
of a belief that only the Messiah could establish a “Jewish state.” 121
This position is still adhered to by some of the “ultra-Orthodox” in
Jerusalem.122 At the same time, many Reform Jews currently withhold
their support in part because of the exclusionist theory of “who is a
Jew” still instantiated in important aspects of Israeli law (such as
marriage).
The English-American translation of “e pluribus unum” is “out
of many, one,” but the American vernacular translation might be “we
are one.” Hector de Crevecoeur captured part of this American spirit
when he wrote:
What then is the American, this new man? He is either
a European, or the descendant of a European, hence that
strange mixture of blood which you will find in no other
country. I could point out to you a family whose
grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was
Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose
present four sons have now four wives of different
nations, He is an American who, leaving behind him all
his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones
from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He
becomes an American by being received in the broad
lap of our great Alma Mater. Here individuals of all
nations are melted into a new race of men, whose
See Image search for “we are one Judaism,” MICROSOFT BING,
https://www.bing.com/images/search?q=we+are+one+judaism&form=QBIR&first
=1&tsc=ImageBasicHover (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
121
See Daniel Sugarman, Who Are the Neturei Karta, JEWISH CHRON. (Sept. 11,
2017),
https://www.thejc.com/comment/comment/who-are-the-neturei-karta1.444090.
122
See Norman Lamm, The Ideology of the Neturei Karta: According to the Satmar
Version, 12 TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 38 (1971).
120
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labours and posterity will one day cause great changes
in the world.123
The more-famous, if less-elegant, version of this catechism is the
Publian claim in Federalist No. 2:
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected
country to one united people—a people descended from
the same ancestors, speaking the same language,
professing the same religion, attached to the same
principles of government, very similar in their manners
and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms,
and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and
bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty
and independence.124
One might easily ask students, “what is wrong with these
pictures?” Consider those numerous Americans who had to read the
Constitution in German or Dutch, and the nearly one-third of all
Americans who were loyalists during the American Revolution, many
of whom had the courtesy to flee what was no longer “their” country.
Racialized chattel slavery was a flourishing institution even in the New
York in which John Jay wrote Federalist No. 2. Slavery was not
abolished in New York until 1827, and the strong connections between
Southern cotton-growers and New York financiers—including the
Jewish Lehman brothers who had moved from Alabama to New
York—helped to explain the Copperhead sympathies of New York’s
Civil War Mayor, Fernando Wood, and the anti-Black antipathy of
many white working class New Yorkers who participated in the antidraft riots of 1863 in New York. 125 E pluribus unum, Crevecoeur, and
Federalist No. 2 were hardly guides to the politics of New York City
during the Civil War, or for that matter, today.
The reason why political actors and leaders of faith
communities proclaim that “we are one” in the face of apparently
intractable diversity is inherent in the nature of collective action.
Government and social life cannot function if persons view themselves
John Hector St. John de Crèvecœur, What is an American? (1782) in LETTERS
FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER, 40, 43-44 (Susan Manning ed., 2009).
124
THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 38 (John Jay).
125
See IVER BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK CITY DRAFT RIOTS: THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (Oxford Univ.
Press 1990).
123
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as truly sovereign and obey only the laws they think just. Rousseau’s
general will describes political and social phenomena. 126 People are
free to vigorously debate proposed government laws and policies, but
no analogous disagreement exists on the duty to obey.127 The general
will governs after the laws are passed or official decisions are made. 128
We are one.
All relationships, to some degree, require the suspension of the
ethical. If, as Graber’s brother-in-law, Rabbi Neil Kominsky, points
out, “all children grow up in mixed households,” then one or both
spouses must consistently make what they think are ethical sacrifices
for the sake of the marriage. 129 Religious education is likely to include
what one or both spouses think are heretical doctrines that will prevent
their offspring from entering the Kingdom of Heaven at the appointed
hour.130 Children are likely to grow up in mixed political households
as well, given no two people are likely to have identical opinions on
all the political issues of the day. These require the same suspension
of the ethical. “Hell is—other people,”131 Sartre declared. Living with
other people inevitably requires doing things that one might fear lead
one to Hell.
Resolving moral-formal dilemmas in favor of
“covenant[s] with death”132 keeps marriages, families, relationships,
and countries intact. Much civil disobedience may be a cry that this
relationship needs counseling, if not a divorce lawyer.

126

See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 69-78 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin Books 1968).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Conversation with Rabbi Neil Kominsky on Feb. 4, 2022 at 9:55 AM EST.
130
This, of course, is the central realization of Huck Finn when he realizes that his
relationship with Jim, the fugitive slave, will require Huck to “go to hell” because of
his choosing loyalty to Jim over loyalty to the slave regime, as represented by a letter
he had written, but not yet sent, to Miss Watson, who represented the “respectable”
and slavery-tolerating, society. See MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF
HUCKLEBERRY FINN 281-84 (Charles L. Webster & Co. 1884) (“It was a close place.
I took . . . up [the letter to Miss Watson], and held it in my hand. I was a-trembling,
because I’d got to decide, forever, betwixt two things, and I knowed [sic] it. I studied
a minute sort of holding my breath, and then says to myself: ‘All right, then, I’ll go
to hell’—and tore it up. It was awful thoughts, and awful words, but they was said.
And I let them stay said; and never thought no more about reforming.”).
131
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, No Exit (1945) in NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 1, 45
(Stuart Gilbert trans., Vintage Books 1989).
132
William Lloyd Garrison, The American Union, 15 LIBERATOR 5, 5 (1845).
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LAWYERS AND THE MORAL-FORMAL-DILEMMA

Cover became a lawyer and entered the legal academy when
the most pressing issue discussed in the halls of academe was
“constitutional interpretation” and more particularly, the role of the
judge in ascribing meaning to what Justice Robert Jackson rightly
identified as the “majestic generalities” of the Constitution. 133 Justice
Accused reflects the “countermajoritarian obsession”134 with the role
of justices in a democracy, as well as the anguished debates taking
place throughout the country over civil disobedience and the
concomitant meaning of “the rule of law.”135 Cover would soon write
pathbreaking works on the nometic capacities of individuals and
groups, who are far removed from the judiciary, to become lawmakers
and declarers of what law requires 136; however, that development
could not have been predicted from Justice Accused. That work
adopted the then (and possibly now) conventional assumption that
Justices might have a special role for maintaining the quality of justice
in the United States or, as Frank Michelman suggested, “listening for
voices from the margin.”137 Ironically, that perception of the unique
role of Justices in facing a moral-formal dilemma was rooted in the
distinctive constitutional politics of the Great Society Era rather than
in a timeless judicial role that united Joseph Story and John McLean,
on the one hand, and Earl Warren and Thurgood Marshall, on the other.
Felix Frankfurter educated the generation of lawyers who came
of age during the New Deal Era in the virtues of what became known
as “judicial restraint.”138 Justices, the catechism went, should defer,
except under very special circumstances, to decisions made by other
133

W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 219 (2002).
135
See COVER, supra note 1, at 6-7.
136
See generally Cover, supra note 92 (discussing the normative world, or nomos,
where people determine rights and wrongs without the judiciary); Robert M. Cover,
The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20
GA. L. REV. 815 (1986) (discussing the law as “one of the liberal arts”).
137
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988).
138
See Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the
Democratic Ideal, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-3 (2007) (discussing the importance of
judicial temperament as embodied by Chief Justice John Marshall). But see Mark A.
Graber, False Modesty: Felix Frankfurter and the Tradition of Judicial Restraint, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 23, 23-27 (2007) (providing a response to Rosen’s essay where
Graber discusses Justice Frankfurter’s false judicial modesty).
134
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branches of government.139 While discussing the role of the Supreme
Court in Trop v. Dulles,140 Justice Frankfurter maintained that the
Court
must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its
own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect
to its own notions of what is wise or politic. That selfrestraint is of the essence in the observance of the
judicial oath, for the Constitution has not authorized the
judges to sit in judgment on the wisdom of what
Congress and the Executive Branch do. 141
Committed to this deferential understanding of judicial power,
Frankfurter became infamous among most progressive students of the
time for his opinions sustaining illiberal uses of state power.142 In State
of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,143 Frankfurter cast the
deciding vote for a 5-4 majority that allowed the state to “re-execute”
a defendant whose first visit to the electric chair was “unsuccessful”
because the current was strong enough only to torture, but not kill,
him.144 Frankfurter was appalled by Louisiana’s cruelty, but he
insisted that was not relevant to his duties as a judge.145 Frankfurter
concluded that
this Court must abstain from interference with State
action no matter how strong one's personal feeling of
revulsion against a State's insistence on its pound of
flesh . . . that were I to hold that Louisiana would
transgress the Due Process Clause if the State were
allowed, in the precise circumstances before us, to carry
out the death sentence, I would be enforcing my private
view rather than that consensus of society's opinion

139

Rosen, supra note 138, at 6-7.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
141
Id. at 120.
142
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-61 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
143
329 U.S. 459, 466-72 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
144
Id. at 460, 464-66.
145
Id. at 470-71.
140
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which, for purposes of due process, is the standard
enjoined by the Constitution.146
Finally, Frankfurter’s dissent on the Court in Baker v. Carr147 told
complainants about malapportionment to attempt to “sear[] the
conscience” of the Tennessee representatives who benefitted from the
existing system.148
Philip Kurland’s notorious “Foreword” to the November 1964
issue of the Harvard Law Review illustrates Frankfurter’s hold on the
generation of scholars who came of age during the New Deal. 149 When
reviewing the previous judicial term, Kurland, in no uncertain terms,
castigated those who were then in control of the Supreme Court for
misusing their power as apex judges.150 Quoting fellow former
Frankfurter clerks Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington, Kurland
asserted
The Court's product has shown an increasing incidence
of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation
of results accompanied by little or no effort to support
them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine
and of per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build
the bridge between the authorities they cite and the
results they decree.151
Id. at 471. Frankfurter’s reference to the “pound of flesh,” of course, can be read
as a reference to Shylock’s demand, in The Merchant of Venice, for Antonio’s
“pound of flesh” as compensation for his failure to meet the terms of the bond he had
entered into with Shylock. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE
act 1, sc. 3, l. 155-63. The money-lender, Shylock, can easily be viewed as an antiSemitic caricature of ostensibly Jewish legalism, against the “mercy” ostensibly
defended by Portia (whose “mercy” in part includes forcing Shylock to convert to
Christianity). So, was Frankfurter consciously emulating his fellow Jew, Shylock,
in legitimizing Louisiana’s demand for its “pound of flesh” instead of joining his
four colleagues who would have been more merciful to the poor wretch, Willie
Francis?
147
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
148
Id. at 270 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
149
See generally Philip B. Kurland, Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143
(1964); Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the
Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN’T 218, 218-20 (Vincent Blasi ed., Yale Univ. Press 1983).
150
Kurland, supra note 149, at 143-45.
151
Id. at 145.
146
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The moral-formal dilemma, Kurland asserted, in all cases south
of Brown v. Board of Education,152 was to be solved in favor of the
law.153 The rule was deference to the decisions of legislatures or other
non-judicial officials authorized to posit law. These comments
obscured how Kurland was a raging proponent of judicial power from
a Frankfurterian perspective. His acceptance of Brown placed him on
the judicial activist side of the Frankfurterian ledger. 154 Many
Frankfurterians, most notably Herbert Wechsler and Learned Hand,
insisted Brown was inconsistent with the judicial duty to decide cases
on the basis of neutral principles, the most neutral of which was the
judicial duty to defer to the legislature. 155
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was Frankfurter’s great
hero and a heroic figure for many other political liberals who came of
age during the New Deal. Holmes may have initially enlisted to fight
for the Union in 1861 because of his moral opposition to slavery; but,
the carnage of war, including three wounds, made him a thoroughgoing
skeptic about the meaning of political morality. 156 Although Holmes
sometimes upheld the legal claims made by progressive activists, he
had no real patience for “do-gooders.” He happily wrote John W.
Davis, who would later defend segregated schools in Brown, that “if
my country wants to go to hell, I am here to help it.”157 Frankfurter
famously defended, in The New Republic,158 Holmes’s judicial
passivity in such cases as Meyer v. Nebraska 159 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,160 which would have allowed states, respectively, to ban
teaching youngsters German and all private education more
152

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Kurland, supra note 149, at 157-58.
154
Id. at 156-58.
155
See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 22-34 (1959) (discussing the Court’s inconsistent neutral principles
in “the school-segregation ruling of 1954” as well as other racially-charged cases).
See also LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (Atheneum 1958).
156
See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND
LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 41-51 (2000) (discussing the differences between a prewar and post-war Justice Holmes).
157
See WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS
120 (Univ. Press Va. 1973) (discussing Davis’s defense of segregation and
eventually his opposite stance later in life).
158
Felix Frankfurter, Unsigned Editorial, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee
Toleration?, NEW REPUBLIC, June 1923 at 85, 86.
159
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
160
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
153
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generally.161 Later that decade, Holmes issued his notorious opinion
in Buck v. Bell.162 In his cavalier three-page opinion, Holmes
dismissed what we would today recognize as standard-model equal
protection arguments as “the usual last resort” of constitutional
lawyers who lacked any genuine arguments for their position. 163 Yosal
Rogat demonstrated that on the racial issues that came before the early
twentieth century Supreme Court, Holmes “simply did not care.” 164
Neither did Frankfurter. Although a committed proponent of racial
equality outside the legal system, 165 Frankfurter devoted nary a word
to Holmes’s willingness to write and join judicial opinions that
accepted the second-class status of African Americans in American
society.166
Comparative youngsters who were just entering the academy
in the 1960s and 1970s were tempted to cite the future Nobelist Bob
Dylan: “[S]omething is happening here/ But you don't know what it is/
Do you, Mr. Jones?”167 In this case, Professor Kurland was the person
who, in the words of another Dylan song, “turn[ed] his head and
pretend[ed] that he just doesn’t see.”
Things were “happening” at the Supreme Court. The heroes of
most progressives of the time were Earl Warren, William Brennan,
and, later, Thurgood Marshall. Warren was celebrated for asking from
the bench whether litigants were championing positions that were
“fair.”168 The Warren Court overturned much precedent in the name
of creating a better United States, although the liberal Justices who sat
on the Warren Court exercised extreme deference to any and all
assertions by Congress of a power to regulate anything touching on

161

See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398, 403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530, 534-35.
274 U.S. 200, 205-208 (1927).
163
Id. at 208.
164
Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 255 (1964).
165
LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS & FRANKFURTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 473-74
(Harper & Row Publishers 1984).
166
Frankfurter talked about Holmes extensively in his reminiscing, but never about
race. See HARLAN B. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (Reynal & Co.
1960).
167
BOB DYLAN, BALLAD OF A THIN MAN (Columbia Records 1965). Graber has no
idea what Levinson is talking about. He suspects this is not a translation of the finale
to Mahler 2.
168
Justin Driver, The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 1101, 1164 (2012).
162
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interstate commerce. 169 “Skepticism, Democracy, and Judicial
Restraint,” Levinson’s 1969 Ph.D. dissertation that discussed the
paragons of judicial restraint—Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Frankfurter, was a typical work written by a member of the rising
generation of legal intellectuals who did not convey much admiration
for either person as a model judge. 170 In Lochner v. New York,171
Holmes dissented, exclaiming that even “tyrannical” laws were
perfectly legitimate in almost all instances.172 Levinson and his peers
treated that comment as being subversive of constitutional democracy
even as their seniors regarded such utterances as being at the heart of
constitutional democracy. 173
The scholars who came of age during the Great Society
changed how constitutional lawyers assessed judges.174 Even if
Frankfurter’s suggestion that the Supreme Court could not “guarantee
toleration”175 was correct, Cover and his generational cohorts, which
included Levinson, were not convinced that Justices should make no
effort to do so. Justice Accused was written at a time when “judicial
restraint” was passe. The Great Society was an era in the United States
of what a recently published book on comparative constitutional law
calls “towering judges.”176 What made a judge “tower” was a
willingness to use judicial power on behalf of humanistic values. 177
The point of being a judge was to use judicial power to make the world
better.178 The moral-formal dilemma was almost always resolved in
favor of justice.179
169

See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964).
170
Sanford Levinson, Skepticism, Democracy, and Judicial Restraint: An Essay on
the Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter (1969) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Harvard University Archives)
[hereinafter Skepticism]. See also Sanford Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix
Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REV. 430, 447-48 (1973) [hereinafter Democratic Faith]
(discussing Frankfurter’s and Holmes’ different paths to judicial restraint).
171
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
172
Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
173
Levinson, supra note 170.
174
Shapiro, supra note 149, at 220-25.
175
Frankfurter, supra note 148, at 85-87.
176
See generally TOWERING JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JUDGES (Rehan Abeyratne & Iddo Porat eds., 2021).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
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The very young Cover and his generation nevertheless initially
adhered to the judicial-centric understanding of the New Deal
conceptual universe. 180 The job of the academic lawyer was devoted
almost entirely to critiquing a particular subset of public officials
called judges.181 Cover’s immediate ancestors explained why those
“towering justices” should defer to the moral judgments made
elsewhere in the political system. 182 Cover and his cohorts offered
justifications of judicial power on behalf of broadly progressive values,
whether defined in terms of anti-slavery, civil rights, or placing
restraints on the modern state’s powers to suppress dissent. 183 They
readily criticized those judges who became, to quote what Holmes
offered as his self-description, “the supple tool of power.” 184 The
constitutional theories of the Great Society were not directed at
presidents or members of Congress because, as Herbert Wechsler had
pointed out, elected officials were authorized to make decisions on
political expedience rather than constitutional principle. 185
The judicial restraint versus judicial activism debate was rooted
in the particular features of the “long state of courts and parties.”186
Throughout much of American history, polarized elites looked to
politics to resolve contested constitutional questions. Both Federalist
No. 48 and Federalist No. 51 scorn parchment barriers as a means for
maintaining the separation of powers. 187 Writing as Publius, both
Madison and Hamilton, thought that “encroachments” would be
prevented if powers were divided horizontally and vertically, between
180

Mark A. Graber, The Collapse of the New Deal Conceptual Universe: The
Schmooze Project, 77 MD. L. REV. 108, 112-13 (2017).
181
Id. at 111-12.
182
See Wechsler, supra note 155, at 22-34 (criticizing various exercises of judicial
power, including the Supreme Court’s “school-segregation ruling of 1954” as well
as other racially-charged cases); HAND, supra note 155, at 56-77.
183
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xii-xiii (Harv. Univ.
Press 1977); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 183 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY ix-x (Yale Univ. Press 1982).
184
Democratic Faith, supra note 170, at 448 n.9. He had suggested this as a possible
carving on his gravestone. Id.
185
Wechsler, supra note 155, at 14-15.
186
See Mark A. Graber, Kahn and the Glorious Long State of Courts and Parties, 4
CONST. STUD. 1, 16 (2019).
187
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 313 (James Madison) (“a mere demarcation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient
guard against those encroachments”).
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the different branches of the federal government and between the
federal and state governments. Controversies over the responsibilities
of different branches of government would be settled by a process of
political negotiation with all government institutions beginning with
sufficient prerogatives to protect their basic functions.188 Martin Van
Buren, Abraham Lincoln, and other prominent political actors during
the middle two quarters of the nineteenth century thought dominant
political parties would resolve contested constitutional questions. 189
At several points in his career, Lincoln pointed to elections as the
means for overthrowing the regime of Dred Scott.190
The moral-formal dilemma in the United States from
ratification to the late nineteenth century occurred only in the relatively
rare instance when a committed antislavery judge adjudicated a
freedom suit. This helps explain why almost all of Cover’s Justices
hailed from free states and tended not to be northern Jacksonians. 191
Most Justices who held office immediately before the Civil War were
slaveholders who fully supported slavery, or northern doughfaces who,
at most, found slavery somewhat distasteful. 192 The only moral-formal
dilemma that pro-slavery judges faced before the Civil War arose in
cases concerning the international slave trade, where federal laws that
aggressively implemented bans on human commerce might be
inconsistent with those Justices’ probable moral views.193 In several
188

The locus-classicus of this argument is THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347-53.
See Mark A. Graber, Separation of Powers, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 224, 235-42 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
190
See Abraham Lincoln, Notes for Speeches at Columbus and Cincinnati, Ohio, in
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 435-36 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers
Univ. Press 1953); Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 435-36 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press
1953). See also GRABER, supra note 53, at 120-26.
191
See COVER, supra note 1, at 81 (noting the many justices who did not experience
moral-formal dilemmas when adjudicating slavery cases because they were not
wholeheartedly opposed to slavery).
192
Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott as a Centrist Decision, 83 N.C.L. REV. 1229, 1232
(2005).
193
Many slaveholders thought the international slave trade, including the Middle
Passage from Africa to the New World, was horrendous. They also believed that
slavery within the United States was benevolent and that new enslaved persons who
were created through the domestic market by breeding would be better attuned to the
demands of American slavery than would newcomers from Africa. For a discussion
of southern debates over the international slave trade, see RONALD T. TAKAKI, A
PRO-SLAVERY CRUSADE: THE AGITATION TO REOPEN THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE
189
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cases, southern Justices echoed Justice Story’s rhetoric in Prigg when
sustaining federal laws restricting the international slave trade. 194 Still,
such decisions may be explained less by the need to respect antislavery
compromises as by substantial opposition to the international slave
trade, banned by the Constitution of the Confederate States 195 and in
most slave states.196 After all, the limitation on the importation of
enslaved persons meant an increase in the market value of domestic
persons who were offered by their “masters” for sale.197
Most anti-slavery Justices in the antebellum regime, Story
being the best example, recognized that slaveholders were crucial
coalition partners. These opponents of human bondage had good
political reasons for supporting laws that they may have believed
necessary to keep their coalition and nation together. 198 Story’s
slavery jurisprudence veered rightwards as he became an important
actor on the national scene. Again, no moral-formal dilemma, or
whatever moral-formal dilemma existed, was resolved by politics. The
only Justices in Jacksonian America who could experience the moralformal dilemma were the few northern state Supreme Court Justices
who were not only anti-slavery, but were also part of anti-slavery
political coalitions.199 As H. Robert Baker amply documented, 200 the
Wisconsin experience demonstrates that such state justices often
(Free Press 1971). Henry Clay acted on this commitment when, as part of the
Compromise of 1850, he proposed the prohibition of the flourishing slave trade in
Washington DC, while continuing to support slavery. See ROBERT REMINI, HENRY
CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE UNION 732-33 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991). He
maintained that the organization of “the remainder of the Mexican cession,” other
than California—which was admitted as a free state, should be without “any
restriction or condition on the subject of slavery.” See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 638 (2005).
194
United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227, 232 (C.C.S.D. 1860) (No. 15,329); In re
Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 1032 (C.C. D. Ga. 1859) (No. 18,269a).
195
The Constitution of the Confederate States of America, in 5 THE COMPLETE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES
100, 104 (Mark A. Graber & Howard Gillman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
196
TAKAKI, supra note 193, at 103-33.
197
Id. at 20-21.
198
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 237-38 (Univ. Cal.
Press 1969).
199
See, e.g., Shelden, supra note 61 (discussing McLean’s antislavery political
connections).
200
H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A FUGITIVE SLAVE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (Ohio Univ. Press 2006).
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resolved the moral-formal dilemma in terms of morality. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin notably sustained a habeas ruling by lower state
courts freeing a collaborator with a fugitive slave from federal
custody.201 Roger Taney rejected any such subversive notion of
“states’ rights” in Ableman v. Booth,202 which continues to be “good
law.”203 Ableman suggests that Jacksonian deference was largely a
myth.204 Justices in slavery cases made decisions based on their proslavery commitments, or those of their political allies. Judicial
deference may have been more a post hoc rationalization, rather than
a sincere commitment.
Constitutional politics was reorganized during the 1880s in a
way that made the moral-formal dilemma a reality for more Justices.
Parties marked by different constitutional visions were gradually
replaced by parties that fought over the spoils of government. 205 By
1912, both the Republican and Democratic parties had a more, and a
less, progressive wing. Levinson’s favorite presidential election, the
four-way contest between Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt,
William Howard Taft, and Eugene V. Debs, was possible only because
neither Democrats nor Republicans were united on a clear
constitutional vision. Parties that were not united on constitutional
visions were poor vehicles for settling constitutional disputes. Some
other institution, or institutional practice, had to be developed to
articulate the official constitutional law of the land. The institution that
replaced political parties was the court system, and the new practice
was modern judicial review. As numerous scholars have documented,
contemporary judicial review dates from the late nineteenth century, 206
not from Marbury v. Madison.207
The peculiar feature of judicial review in the “long state of
courts and parties” was that the justices were far more united than the
parties on certain constitutional issues, at least with respect to policy
preferences.208 Legal elites had opinions that differed substantially
201

In re Booth, 3 Wis 1 (1854).
62 U.S. 506 (1859).
203
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008).
204
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
LAWS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 38-59 (Univ. Press Kan. 2019).
205
Graber, supra note 138, at 242-48.
206
See, e.g., ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (University Press Kan. 1989); WHITTINGTON, supra note 204, at 38-39.
207
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
208
Graber, supra note 186, at 16.
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from those of ordinary citizens on the civil rights and civil liberties
issues that confronted the Court during the three decades after World
War II.209 Legal elites were committed to at least weak forms of racial
equality. They favored giving free speech rights to Communists and
Jehovah’s Witnesses, and they endorsed wholeheartedly the due
process revolution.210 Ordinary Americans were badly divided on
these matters, with rural and southern states more firmly committed to
Jim Crow, restricting free speech, and crime-control models of
criminal justice.211 When feminism and the sexual revolution hit the
courts beginning in the 1960s, the same phenomena recurred: legal
elites were enthusiastic proponents of weak liberal feminism and
tended to support the sexual revolution, while less legal, and less elite,
citizens were either divided or opposed. 212
The constitutional politics of the “long state of courts and
parties” help explain why both Frankfurter and Cover treated moralformal dilemmas as distinctively within the province of Justices, rather
than as a conundrum for all participants in the constitutional order.213
During the Jacksonian age, members of Congress, presidents, and
political parties were considered important vehicles of constitutional
meaning.214 By 1970, proponents of judicial restraint and activism
united in support of Ronald Dworkin’s later claim that the judiciary
was the unique forum of principle. 215 Debate was entirely over
whether the forum of principle was committed to judicial restraint or
judicial activism.216
During the Jacksonian era, elites bitterly divided on the
morality of slavery, on tolerating slavery, and on such matters as the
merits of the national bank and internal improvements.217 Few Justices
actually confronted a moral-formal dilemma when considering
209

See, e.g., DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE, supra note 8, at 243-44.
Id.
211
Id.
212
See Mark A. Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion,
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOWARD L. J. 661,
687-88 (2013).
213
See COVER, supra note 1, at 6 (noting his study was about judges). For
Frankfurter’s emphasis on the judicial duty to follow law rather than morality, see
supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
214
See LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 40.
215
Graber, supra note 180, at 111.
216
See, e.g., DAVID F. FORTE, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (Heath 1972).
217
See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 173-79.
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questions about the powers of the national government that did not
directly concern slavery.218 By 1970, almost all Justices were New
Deal liberals who abhorred Jim Crow and McCarthyism. 219 The
moral-formal dilemma Cover wrote about was what Justices, and
presumably only liberal Justices, faced in the Great Society when
confronted with choices between judicial restraint and judicial
activism.220
The Supreme Court occupied the central place in the self-image
of such places as Columbia or Yale, where Cover taught (not to
mention Harvard). Supreme Court Justices occupied prominent places
in the physical buildings that housed the leading law schools in the
United States. Anyone wandering the halls of most elite law schools
and looking at the pictures of noted alumni who occupied the walls,
who served as inspirations to new generations of students, would
conclude that the job of the law school was to prepare students to
become Supreme Court Justices. If they could not sit on the bench,
students inspired by those portraits might become “cause lawyers”
who would bring Supreme Court Justices sometimes audacious, but
always brilliant, arguments whose acceptance would make the United
States a more just society. The conversation in the physical building
was devoted to the Supreme Court. Both in class and in named
lectures, typically named after a Supreme Court Justice, students
learned that the only judges worth talking about were Supreme Court
Justices who had the practical power to reshape the law. Judges of
what the Constitution labels as “inferior” courts 221 were rarely
discussed at any great length, not least because they were viewed,
rightly or wrongly, as far more constrained. There were a few
exceptions, such as Learned Hand 222 or Henry Friendly,223 but by
Cover’s era they were, like Frankfurter, figures of the past. 224
218

See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions Into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004).
219
See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (Harv.
Univ. Press 2000).
220
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
221
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9.
222
See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (Harv. Univ.
Press 1994).
223
See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA (Harv.
Univ. Press 2012).
224
See. e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 222, at 664 (noting that by 1960 Hand when
calling for judicial restraint “stood . . . virtually alone”); Michael Boudin, Judge
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This fixation with Supreme Court judges (and judging) helps
explain the modern academic (fixation with debating the pros and cons
of “originalism.”225 Originalism matters, if originalism matters at
all,226 only when the Supreme Court is making decisions. Whatever
one thinks of originalism, and of such judges as Antonin Scalia or
Clarence Thomas, originalism has little value with regard to almost all
the constitutional litigation that takes place outside the sacred temple
of the Supreme Court. As Levinson argued nearly a quarter century
ago, debates over originalism are wholly irrelevant to most practicing
lawyers who will never argue a case before the Supreme Court and
“inferior” judges who define their role, for better or worse, as faithful
agents of Supreme Court precedents.227 Some version of doctrinalism
is the currency in the vast majority of constitutional arguments that
take place in the lower federal courts. That some lower federal court
justices might offer what appear to be strained interpretations of past
precedent does not contradict the point that they present themselves as
faithful agents. The very few “inferior” judges who dare to “overrule”
the Supreme Court, even in the name of originalism, are almost always
chastised.228
That Cover fixated on the role of the “judicial process” and
judges when discussing the great conflicts that wrack our society was
overdetermined and overvalued. What judges do, especially in the
modern world, is respond to legislation passed by Congress or state
legislatures or to decisions made by state or federal administrative
agencies. Legal realists insisted that judges themselves “make law”;
but, as an empirical matter, non-judicial officials were far more

Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975, 993
(2007) (noting that Friendly was out of step with Warren Court activism).
225
See David Fontana, Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 189, 190 (2010).
226
See ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FAITH (Cambridge Univ. Press 2018).
227
See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual
Performance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495 (1996), reprinted in
The Operational Irrelevance of Originalism, in LIBERTY UNDER LAW: AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM, YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW 105, 106, 112
(Kenneth L. Grasso & Cecilia Rodriguez Castillo eds., 1997).
228
For the fate of Judge Brevard Hand’s idiosyncratic interpretations of the
Establishment Clause, see Jaffress v. Bd. Sch. Comm’rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (D.C.
Ala. 1983). Or see also the Court’s opinion in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997), when an inferior court dared, altogether correctly, to suggest that a precedent
of the Supreme Court was in fact ripe for overruling because of the Court’s own clear
hesitation to continue subscribing to it.
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important as law-makers.229 Judges intervened in fugitive slave cases
only in the rare instance when a claimed fugitive slave was hauled
before a state or federal court or, in the rarer instance, when persons
who assisted fugitives were indicted for federal crimes. 230 The
constitutional issues raised by the Vietnam War were resolved by the
President and Congress. 231 The constitutionality of the War Powers
Act of 1975232 has yet to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964233 and Voting Rights Act of 1965234 were the
subjects of intense constitutional debate in Congress235 and both did
far more than any Supreme Court decision to eradicate Jim Crow. 236
The contemporary fixation with Justices is also a product of
“the long state of courts and parties.” 237 Donald Morgan noted many
years ago that for most of the nineteenth century, Congress was at least
as much, if not considerably more, the center of constitutional debate
in the United States than the Supreme Court. 238 Congress debated the
constitutionality of the national bank for more than thirty years until
the Supreme Court in McCulloch did little more than reiterate
arguments made in the national legislature and national executive. 239
Questions of internal improvements were debated entirely within the
national legislature, as were the questions raised by territorial
expansion.240 The central themes of Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sanford241 were articulated in the debates over the Missouri
229

See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy Revisited: Independent
Constitutional Authority in American Constitutional Law and Practice, 58 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1549 (2017).
230
One might compare the number of fugitive slaves to the number of federal and
state cases on fugitive slaves.
231
See SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE
ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES (Univ. Press Kan, 1992).
232
87 STAT. 555 (1973).
233
78 STAT. 241 (1964).
234
79 STAT. 437 (1965).
235
See generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960-1972 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
236
See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: C AN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed., Univ. Chi. Press 2008).
237
See Graber, supra note 186, at 16.
238
See DONALD GRANT MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF
RESPONSIBILITY (Harv. Univ. Press 1966).
239
See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 124-36.
240
See Graber, supra note 218, at 508-16.
241
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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Compromise.242 Questions of presidential and congressional power
over war and peace were analyzed extensively during the Mexican
War, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. 243 Had Herbert Wechsler
made his claim that we do not expect principled constitutional
arguments from elected officials 244 in a history seminar, he would have
politely been given a dime (or a burner cell phone), told to call his
parents, and report to them that he would never be an historian.
The issues discussed by Cover, and manifested in Story’s and
McLean’s anguish, about conforming to their role as a judge
committed to enforcing the law—independent of their views about the
wisdom or morality of the issues being litigated—were hardly unique
to judges in antebellum America. Alexis de Toqueville’s oft-quoted
remark that in America, all political issues are transformed into legal
issues decided by judges 245 is demonstrably false,246 even if
Americans may be exceptional in “constitutionalizing” what in other
countries would be only political disputes. 247 Judges throughout
American history have never been viewed as the only proper officials
to debate and resolve important constitutional controversies.248 Public
officials, most of whom were not lawyers, were expected to make
constitutional arguments and to be bound by their conclusions.249
One of the first great constitutional debates, which was over the
legitimacy of chartering the Bank of the United States in 1791, was
resolved by George Washington when he decided to sign the bill
passed by Congress250 only after listening to the constitutional
242

See GRABER, supra note 53.
See, e.g., AMY S. GREENBERG, A WICKED WAR: POLK, CLAY, LINCOLN, AND THE
1846 U.S. INVASION OF MEXICO (Vintage Books 2012); DANIEL A. FARBER,
LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (Univ. Chi. Press 2003); GREGORY P. DOWNS, AFTER
APPOMATTOX: MILITARY OCCUPATION AND THE ENDS OF WAR (Harv. Univ. Press
2015); MARK A. GRABER, PUNISH TREASON, REWARD LOYALTY: THE FORGOTTEN
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT I (forthcoming 2022).
244
Wechsler, supra note 155, at 14-15.
245
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Vintage Classics 1990).
246
See generally Graber, supra note 218.
247
This gap between the U.S. and the rest of the world may, however, be narrowing.
See generally Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of
Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93 (2008).
248
See JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS,
AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998).
249
See MORGAN, supra note 238.
250
See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL War 118 (Princeton Univ. Press 1957).
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arguments presented him by the members of his cabinet, Edmund
Randolph,251 Thomas Jefferson,252 and Alexander Hamilton.253 Two
of them, Randolph and Jefferson, agreed with James Madison that the
Bill was unconstitutional. 254 Hamilton did not, and the non-lawyer,
Washington, was persuaded by Hamilton’s arguments.255 This is
certainly not a one-off with regard to important decisions being made
in the halls of Congress or the White House, free from the opinions
that Justices of the Court might have. 256 Perhaps one might simply
want to say that “the past is a different country,” given the degree to
which modern Solons seem altogether happy to subordinate
themselves to judicial supremacy 257; but, that is worth debating—after
first being recognized as a fundamental change in our overall
constitutional order.
The Framers in 1787 were writing on a “clean slate” inasmuch
as none could claim to be making their decisions on the basis of
anything other than political prudence, the English constitutional
experience, which was non-binding in the United States, or perhaps for
some of them, the dictates of “natural justice.” 258 There was no
positive law to which they felt themselves required to be faithful. 259
Washington, Madison, and friends ignored the “command” of the
Articles of Confederation that amendment take place only if agreed to
unanimously by the legislatures of the thirteen member states. 260
Federalist No. 40 is a paean to the leadership by public-spirited
251

For the letter from Randolph to President Washington, see The Constitutionality
of the Bank Bill: The Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinion, 44 DUKE
L. J. 110, 121 (1994).
252
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank, in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 261, 261-67 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin
Books 1975).
253
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion of the Constitutionality of the Bank, February
23, 1791, in THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Harper
& Row 1964).
254
See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944-51 (1791).
255
See HAMMOND, supra note 250, at 117-18.
256
See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 204.
257
See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
258
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting ratification raised
the question “whether societies of men are really capable or not or establishing good
government from reflection and choice”).
259
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, AT 105-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (detailing the
“imbecility” of the Articles of Confederation).
260
GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 68-70.
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delegates who did not feel constrained by the “absurdity” of the
requirement set out in the Articles of Confederation that amendment
require unanimous consent of all state legislatures.261 “Forms,”
proclaimed Madison, “ought to give way to substance.”262 One should
certainly not valorize a “rigid adherence” to forms when adherence
would be fatal to meeting the great “exigencies” that brought the
delegates to Philadelphia in the first place. 263
Once the Constitution was ratified, the situation presumably
changed. Insofar as many judges, beginning with Marshall in Marbury
v. Madison,264 adverted to their oath required by Article VI of the
Constitution—to be faithful to the demands of the Constitution. This
is the identical issue that is presented for all officials, both state and
federal.265 Article VI requires all officials to take a similar oath, as
does the president whose oath is spelled out in Article II.266 So what
did taking the oath, and taking the oath seriously, mean? Particularly
with regard to the issues presented by slavery that so captivated Cover?
Whatever one’s answer to that question, is the answer
significantly different for judges as compared to legislators or
presidents? Should one be more cynical about the constitutional
professions of legislators or presidents than about similar arguments
when made in judicial opinions? We think most legal academics
tended to brush off that possibility. They agreed with Dworkin that
only the judiciary could be “the forum of principle,” 267 whereas
legislatures were basically cesspools of unprincipled political
judgment.
The career and arguments made by one of the most significant
public officials in Jacksonian America, Daniel Webster, 268 may shed
light on the moral-formal dilemma constitutional authorities in
electoral politics faced with respect to fugitive slaves. Just as Story is
second only to Marshall, the most distinguished judge of the ante261

THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).
Id. at 253.
263
Id. at 248, 252-53. See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL:
READING THE FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 149-151 (“Exigency and Fidelity
to Law”).
264
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
265
U.S. CONST. art. 4, cl. 3.
266
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 8.
267
See generally Dworkin, supra note 20.
268
For Webster’s influence on antebellum American constitutionalism, see PETER
CHARLES HOFFER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTION (2021).
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bellum period,269 so Webster, along with Henry Clay and John C.
Calhoun, was one of the three greatest political figures of Jacksonian
America.270 Webster was a senator and Secretary of State. He argued
myriads of cases before the United States Supreme Court, most notably
McCulloch v. Maryland271 and the Dartmouth College Case,272 where
he famously defended his and Graber’s alma mater against efforts by
the state of New Hampshire to convert Dartmouth into the University
of New Hampshire by altering the corporate charter. Webster’s views
about fugitive slaves hardly reflected a consensus about the issue, even
in the North. Debate over slavery and the Constitution was as heated
in the free states as it was throughout the country. Webster
nevertheless stood out as a leader, a person who so spoke for the
northern view of the Constitution that he was immortalized by Stephen
St. Vincent Benet as willing to debate Satan to save the soul of an
ordinary representative of the free states. 273
Webster’s great speech of March 7, 1850, defended the
Compromise of 1850. That bargain included an even more onerous
version of the original Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 that Story upheld in
Prigg.274 Webster took the floor of the Senate to urge fellow free state
representatives and citizens to support a Constitution and a bill
implementing that Constitution that conflicted with their cherished
moral beliefs, where he stated:
Mr. President, in the excited times in which we live,
there is found to exist a state of crimination and
recrimination between the North and South. . . . But I
will state . . . one complaint of the South, which has in
my opinion just foundation; and that is, that there has
been found at the North, among individuals and among
legislators, a disinclination to perform fully their
constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE WORDS THAT MADE US: AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION, 1760-1840 (2021) (providing enthusiastic
encomia to Marshall and Story as key figures in the making of America).
270
See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (discussing the vital roles Webster, Clay and
Calhoun played in Jacksonian America).
271
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
272
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 41 (1819).
273
STEPHEN VINCENT BENET, THE DEVIL AND DANIEL WEBSTER AND OTHER TALES
OF AMERICAN HISTORY (Hythloday Press 2014).
274
See supra note 13.
269
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bound to service who have escaped into the free States.
In that respect, the South, in my judgment, is right, and
the North is wrong. Every member of every Northern
legislature is bound by oath, like every other officer in
the country, to support the Constitution of the United
States; and the article of the Constitution which says to
these States that they shall deliver up fugitives from
service is as binding in honor and conscience as any
other article. No man fulfills his duty in any legislature
who sets himself to find excuses, evasions, escapes from
this constitutional obligation. I have always thought
that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures
of the States or to the States themselves. It says that
those persons escaping to other States, shall be
delivered up, and I confess I have always been of the
opinion that it was an injunction upon the States
themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into
another State, and coming therefrom within the
jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up, it seems
to me the import of the clause is, that the State itself, in
obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be
delivered up. That is my judgment. I have always
entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now. But
when the subject, some years ago, was before the
Supreme Court of the United States [in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania], the majority of the judges held that the
power to cause fugitives from service to be delivered
up was a power to be exercised under the authority of
this Government. . . . My habit is to respect the result
of judicial deliberations and the solemnity of judicial
decisions. As it now stands, the business of seeing that
these fugitives are delivered up resides in the power of
Congress and the national judicature, and my friend at
the head of the Judiciary Committee [James M. Mason]
has a bill on the subject, now before the Senate, which,
with some amendments to it, I propose to support, with
all its provisions, to the fullest extent. And I desire to
call the attention of all sober-minded men at the North,
of all conscientious men, of all men who are not carried
away by some fanatical idea or some false impression,
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to their constitutional obligations. I put it to all the sober
and sound minds at the North as a question of morals
and a question of conscience. What right have they, in
their legislative capacity or any other capacity, to
endeavor to get round this Constitution, or to embarrass
the free exercise of the rights secured by the
Constitution to the persons whose slaves escape from
them? None at all—none at all. Neither in the forum of
conscience, nor before the face of the Constitution, are
they justified; in my opinion. . . . I say that the South
has been injured in this respect, and has a right to
complain; and the North has been too careless of what
I think the Constitution peremptorily and emphatically
enjoins upon her as a duty.275
Webster was concerned, as was Story in Prigg, with preserving the
Union. By 1850, calls for “secession” were something to which any
“conscientious legislator”276 had to attend. One might dismiss the calls
for “No Union with Slaveholders,” issued by William Lloyd Garrison
and Wendell Phillips, 277 as what a later President might call
“malarkey,”278 representing little more than the venting by a
dissatisfied, relatively powerless minority than a real threat to national
survival. Similar threats issued by slaveholders, represented extremely
ably in the Senate by John C. Calhoun and others, were far more
serious. William Freehling has detailed how calls for measuring “the
price of Union” had become commonplace in the land of cotton. 279
Well aware of these stakes Webster continued:
Mr. President, I should much prefer to have heard from
every member on this floor declarations of opinion that
this Union could never be dissolved, than the
declaration of opinion by any body, that, in any case,
under the pressure of any circumstances, such a
dissolution was possible. I hear with distress and
anguish the word secession, especially when it falls
275

Congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., App., 274-75 (emphasis added).
See generally Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
277
See MAYER, supra note 67, at 328.
278
See President Joe Biden (@POTUS), TWITTER, (July 2, 2021).
279
See generally FREEHLING, supra note 69.
276
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from the lips of those who are patriotic, and known to
the country, and known all over the world, for their
political services. Secession! Peaceable secession! . . .
There can be no such thing as peaceable secession.
Peaceable secession is an utter impossibility. . . . I see
it as plainly as I see the sun in heaven−I see that
disruption must produce such a war as I will not
describe . . . .280
Americans, this speech indicated, had a choice. They could live in
Union “half-free” and “half-slave,” or they could bring down the
constitutional house.281
Webster, the elected official, was joined at the hip with Story,
the federal judge.282 Webster’s arguments on March 7 track quite
closely to those that Story made in Prigg. Both suffered the same
consequence for their reputations in the free states. Both were
excoriated by many former New England supporters for betraying their
past support, if not of “abolitionism,” then at least for making no
further accommodations with the “slavocracy.” 283 Webster and Story
opposed the admission of Texas to the Union because, since Texas was
a foreign country, admission required ratification of a treaty by twothirds of the Senate, which could never have been attained. 284
Admission was initially predicated on such a treaty, but President John
Tyler decided, after the treaty failed in the Senate, that Texas could be
treated as a “territory” and admitted by a simple majority vote of both
houses of Congress.285 Webster and Story disagreed. They fought
bitterly against statehood. Webster’s constituents cheered his fight
against Texas statehood because they correctly viewed admitting

280

Congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., App., 276.
See Abraham Lincoln, Senator, Address at the Republican State Convention:
House Divided (June 16, 1858),
282
See HOFFER, supra note 268, at 24.
283
See MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE
UNION 417-418 (Harv. Univ. Press 1984); DUNNE, supra note 70, at 304-06.
284
See BAXTER, supra note 283, at 374-77; R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 351 (Univ. N.C. Press
1985).
285
See generally Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Louisiana Purchase, the
Annexation of Texas, and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND
AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2006)
(discussing constitutional issues raised by the annexation of Texas).
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Texas as expanding slavery into the west.286 By supporting the
Compromise of 1850, Webster appeared to have abandoned the
antislavery principles underlying his opposition to Texas. The
demigod whose eulogy to the free state farmer could soften even the
heart of the Devil now offered “constitutional arguments” for why
support for the enhanced Fugitive Slave Law was, to coin a phrase,
both “necessary and proper” with regard to his duties as a
conscientious Senator. 287
The Compromise of 1850 was brokered in part by Henry Clay,
the iconic hero of another politician originally from Kentucky who,
unlike Clay, became president. 288 Lincoln’s views about the Fugitive
Slave Act echoed those of his beau ideal and those of Daniel Webster.
The Illinois Whig turned Republican frequently emphasized his hatred
of slavery.289 No reason exists for doubting the sincerity of that
sentiment. At the same time, Lincoln was fully committed to the
American system of government established by the Constitution.
From an early age, Lincoln insisted that moral-formal dilemmas be
resolved in favor the law.
In a now-famous speech that Lincoln delivered in Springfield,
Illinois, in 1838, at the age of twenty-nine (roughly the same age as
Cover when drafting Justice Accused), the young lawyer denounced
the spirit of lawlessness that he saw threatening the American
experiment. Lincoln illustrated this spirit primarily through examples
of mob violence against abolitionists, but he appeared equally
censorious of the then-rising number of abolitionists who themselves
seemed less than fully devoted to their duties as American citizens. 290
The future president warned that if legal rights are ultimately held “by
no better tenure than the caprice of a mob, the alienation of [the
people’s] affections from the Government is the natural consequence;

286

See BAXTER, supra note 283, at 376.
See Congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., App., 274-76; HOFFER, supra
note 268, at 139-54.
288
Abraham Lincoln, Eulogy on Henry Clay (1852), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 121-32 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
289
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago, Illinois (1858), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 492 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953) (“I have
always hated slavery.”).
290
Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield,
Illinois. (1838), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 113 (Roy P. Basler
ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
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and to that, sooner or later, it must come.”291 Persons from all sections
of the United States could remain attached to the regime only if all
agreed to follow law, rather than conscience. Lincoln declared:
Let every American, every lover of liberty, every well
wisher to his posterity, swear by the blood of the
Revolution, never to violate in the least particular, the
laws of the country; and never to tolerate their violation
by others. As the patriots of seventy-six did to the
support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the
support of the Constitution and Laws, let every
American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred
honor;−let every man remember that to violate the law,
is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the
character of his own, and his children's liberty. Let
reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American
mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap−let
it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges;
let it be written in Primers, spelling books, and in
Almanacs;−let it be preached from the pulpit,
proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts
of justice. And, in short, let it become the political
religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the
rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and
tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice
unceasingly upon its altars. . . .
....
When I so pressingly urge a strict observance of all the
laws, let me not be understood as saying there are no
bad laws, nor that grievances may not arise, for the
redress of which, no legal provisions have been made.
I mean to say no such thing. But I do mean to say, that,
although bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as
soon as possible, still while they continue in force, for
the sake of example, they should be religiously
observed. So also in unprovided cases. If such arise, let
proper legal provisions be made for them with the least

291

Id. at 112.
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possible delay; but, till then, let them, if not too
intolerable, be borne with.292
Daniel Webster would make the same appeal in a different context
thirteen years later. 293
Lincoln’s comments about constitutional fidelity had
consequences for the issues presented by American slavery. Although
Lincoln vigorously opposed the extension of slavery into any of the
American territories, 294 he not only accepted the legal propriety of
slavery in the states where it already existed, 295 the so-called “federal
compromise,” but also, and more relevantly, the legality of the
Fugitive Slave Laws of 1793 and 1850. 296 Neither law nor the
behaviors it sanctioned apparently required anything “intolerable”
from a citizenry charged with “strict observance of all the laws.”297
Lincoln elaborated his views on legality in his 1854 address in Peoria,
Illinois. That speech marked Lincoln’s return to electoral politics in
light of his anger over the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the
Kansas-Nebraska Act.298 Lincoln condemned the expansion of slavery
into the west but accepted the Compromise of 1850, including the
Fugitive Slave Law, which was designed to preserve slavery in the
south and border states. 299 Both his antislavery and proslavery
commitments were rooted in fidelity to the Constitution and national
union.300 Lincoln in his Peoria address referred to the Missouri
Compromise and Compromise of 1850 when praising a capitalized
“Spirit of Compromise,” which he defined as “the spirit of mutual
concession . . . which first gave us the constitution and which has

292

Id. at 112-13.
See supra notes 272-85 and accompanying text.
294
See Abraham Lincoln, To Joshua Speed (1855), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 320-23 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
295
See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Harford, Connecticut (1860), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 5 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
296
Abraham Lincoln, To Thurlow Weed (1865), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 154 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953) (“I probably
think all opposition, real and apparent, to the fugitive slave [clause] of the
constitution ought to be withdrawn.”).
297
Supra note 291.
298
Kansas-Nebraska Act, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
299
See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 259 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
300
See GRABER, supra note 53, at 200-05.
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[twice thereafter] saved the Union.” 301 Lincoln called for Americans
to stand “on the middle ground” that can hold the ship of state “level
and steady.”302 That meant standing “against” those who would repeal
the Fugitive Slave Act or refuse to enforce that measure.303
Lincoln repeated the central themes of his Peoria speech in his
First Inaugural Address. Much attention has been given to his refusal
to accept Dred Scott as dispositive regarding the Republican
commitment to preventing the extension of slavery into the
territories,304 but slavery in the west was a different subject than
slavery in the south. The First Inaugural Address remained committed
to the “federal consensus” and to the Fugitive Slave Clause, 305 the
central commitments of what Don Fehrenbacher called “The
Slaveholding Republic.”306 Whether Lincoln’s “fidelity to the
Constitution” captured numerous executive actions acts during the
War, including the emancipation proclamation, remains a subject of
debate,307 but those actions were in the future. Upon taking office,
Lincoln insisted Americans focus solely on explicit constitutional
commitments. He called on his fellow citizens to allow the
constitutional processes for staffing the national government that were
not in dispute to resolve questions about the status of slavery that were
in dispute.308 Putting aside questions about the democratic credentials
of the Electoral College, the person who won the 1860 presidential
election with less than forty percent of the popular vote declared, “from
questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and

301

Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (1854), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 272 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
302
Id. at 273.
303
Id.
304
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address–Final Text (1861), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
305
Id. at 263-64.
306
See generally DON E. FENHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward
M. McAfee ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A
SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Univ. Chi. Press 2010).
307
See NOAH FELDMAN, THE BROKEN CONSTITUTION: LINCOLN, SLAVERY, AND THE
REFOUNDING OF AMERICA (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux 2021); see also, FARBER, supra
note 232.
308
GRABER, supra note 53, at 179-81.
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we divide upon them into majorities and minorities. If the minority will
not acquiesce, the majority must, or the government must cease.” 309
The policy underlying the Fugitive Slave Clause was a
constitutional matter not in dispute, even as Americans contested the
best means for implementing that policy. After quoting the relevant
passage from Article IV, Lincoln went on:
It is scarcely questioned that this provision was
intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of
what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the
lawgiver is the law. All members of Congress swear
their support to the whole Constitution--to this
provision as much as to any other. To the proposition,
then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of
this clause "shall be delivered up" their oaths are
unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good
temper, could they not with nearly equal unanimity
frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good
that unanimous oath? . . .
....
I take the official oath to-day with no mental
reservations and with no purpose to construe the
Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules; and
while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of
Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it
will be much safer for all, both in official and private
stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which
stand unrepealed than to violate any of them trusting to
find impunity in having them held to be
unconstitutional.310
Webster and Lincoln placed their loyalty to the Constitution (and
preserving the Union), to which they had sworn a solemn oath, above
any opposition they might have on moral grounds to slavery. For
Webster, this commitment to the Constitution required voting for the
revised Fugitive Slave Act to preserve the Union. For Lincoln, this
commitment to the Constitution required wholehearted support for
enforcing fugitive slave laws and punishing those who resisted
enforcement by joining mobs bent on liberating fugitives from
309
310

Lincoln, supra note 304, at 267.
Id. at 263-64.
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rendition back to slave states. Law trumped morality or, even better,
obedience to the law was the highest form of morality when obeying
the law was a means for maintaining national union.
Frederick Douglass resolved moral-formal dilemmas
differently. Consider his “Is it Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?”311
that was published the same year as Lincoln’s Peoria speech. Douglass,
the best-known former fugitive slave in the United States, addressed
the killing by an anti-slavery mob in Boston of James Balchelder, a
United States Marshal engaged in returning Anthony Burns, a fugitive
slave, to his southern owner. 312 Conventional wisdom described
Balchelder’s killing as “murder.”313 Douglass demurred. The “right
to life” is not absolute, he claimed, as evidenced by the ability of those
claiming “self-defense” to take life rather than be subjected to the
potential loss of their liberty. 314 The same principle applied when the
liberty of a fugitive slave was at issue. Douglass insisted:
A[] human life is not superior . . . to the eternal law of
justice, which is essential to the preservation of the
rights, and the security, and happiness of the race.
The argument thus far is to the point, that society has
the right to preserve itself even at the expense of the life
of the aggressor; and it may be said that while what we
allege may be right enough, as regards society, it is false
as vested in an individual, such as the poor, powerless,
and almost friendless wretch now in the clutches of this
proud and powerful republican government. But we
take it to be a sound principle, that when government
fails to protect the just rights of any individual man,
either he or his friends may be held in the sight of God
and man, innocent, in exercising any right for his
preservation which society may exercise for its
preservation. Such an individual is flung, by his
untoward circumstances, upon his original right of selfdefense. We hold, therefore, that when James
Balchelder . . . abandoned his useful employment, as a
311

See generally FREDERICK DOUGLASS, IS IT RIGHT AND WISE TO KILL A
KIDNAPPER, in THE ESSENTIAL DOUGLASS: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
(Nicholas Buccola ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2016).
312
Id. at 76-77.
313
Id. at 76.
314
Id. at 77.
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common laborer and took upon himself the revolting
business of a kidnapper [helping those who would
return Anthony Burns to his condition as an enslaved
person], he labeled himself the common enemy of
mankind, and his slaughter was as innocent, in the sight
of God, as would be the slaughter of a ravenous wolf in
the act of throttling an infant.315
Violence and civil disobedience were justifiable responses according
to Douglass’s understanding of the moral-formal dilemma.
Neither Lincoln nor any other established American political
leader agreed with Douglass. No judge accepted the claim of “selfdefense” in the Anthony Burns case, a defense offered by an
abolitionist supporter of Burns, rather than Burns himself.316 This
might demonstrate that Douglass’s argument is wrong. “Neutral”
officials wielding “neutral principles” recognized that the price of
American Union and the meaning of devotion to preserving the
Constitution that is dedicated to preserving the Union was accepting
the legitimacy of the Fugitive Slave Law and “rendering” back to
slavery those caught in that law’s vise. The difference between
Lincoln and Frederick Douglass might also be the difference between
a government official, or an aspirant to public office, and the leader of
a social movement. Moral-formal dilemmas may look different to the
outsiders who lead crusades for justice or write in the law reviews than
those charged with preserving the social order.
These ruminations on Webster, Lincoln, and other
“conscientious” legislators raise questions about whether members of
Congress or presidents of the United States do, or should, operate
under the same cross-pressures that Cover identified so memorably in
his 1975 book. One important inquiry is whether we should evaluate
Webster, Lincoln, other non-judicial officials opposed to slavery in the
antebellum United States, or other non-judicial officials faced with
different moral-formal dilemmas using different standards than those
we apply to judges in the same circumstances. We might expect more
constitutional fidelity, and less moral sensitivity, from judges than
from elected political officials. Justices often pride themselves in

315

Id. at 78.
See EARL M. MALTZ, FUGITIVE SLAVE ON TRIAL: THE ANTHONY BURNS CASE
AND ABOLITIONIST OUTRAGE 55-89 (Univ. Press Kan. 2010).
316
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doing what is constitutional rather than what is wise or just. 317
Alternatively, life tenure might enable Justices to rise above the petty
constitutional and political bargains that often characterize
constitutional politics. If Justices have “special capacities to listen to
voices from the margin,”318 perhaps they are better positioned then
other governing officials to be the “conscience of the nation’s
pluralism”319 or “republican schoolmasters,”320 when moral
imperatives clash with words written down in the often-distant past.
The year 1975 also saw the publication of Paul Brest’s
“Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,” 321
which took seriously the possibility that at least some public officials
would take their oaths of office, to “support, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States,” with the same degree of seriousness
as do judges. The questions Brest raised differ from the debate, which
was provoked by Edmund Burke’s letter to the Bristol electors, 322 over
whether a “representative” should be an instructed “delegate” or a
“trustee” charged with taking the comprehensive national interest into
account, even when that interest clashes with the values or selfish
wishes of factional constituents. 323
Madison, in Federalist No. 10, maintained the only genuine
cure for the “faction” was an “extended republic” that would privilege
the election of public-spirited, national-level officials.324
“Conscientious Legislators,” who followed the Constitution even
when doing so risked the ire of their constituents, still had to determine
whether to follow the Constitution when doing so risked the ire of their
conscience or their God. Neither Madison nor Hamilton (nor Jay) in
the “Federalist Papers” explored what “public-spirited” officials
317

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining why justices must
not give “effect to [their] own notions of what is wise or politic”).
318
Michelman, supra note 137, at 1537.
319
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 413 (1991).
320
Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S. CT. REV.
127, 180 (1967).
321
See generally Brest, supra note 276.
322
Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, in THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, 391-392(1) (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., Univ. Chi. Press
1987).
323
HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (Univ. Cal. Press
1967) (discussing the role of the representative).
324
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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should do when they concluded that some policy that would
undoubtedly serve the public weal was also, alas, unconstitutional.
Madison, as President, vetoed banking and internal improvements bills
that he thought presented good policy on the ground but that the
national government had no constitutional power to authorize such
measures.325 A committed slaveholder, he never confronted a situation
where doing right by moral or God’s law differed from doing right by
constitutional law.
Public officials may only partially evade moral-formal
dilemmas by adopting the legal realism cum judicial-supremacist
position that nothing is constitutional or unconstitutional unless and
until the Supreme Court weighed in. Morality, in this view, governs
until the U.S. Reports compels legality. This stalling tactic leaves open
the proper response to judicial decisions that the conscientious
legislator believes are dreadfully wrong and disserve the public
interest. Andrew Jackson insisted that governing officials could not
defer moral-formal dilemmas or any other constitutional decision to
the judiciary. His message vetoing the renewal of the Second Bank of
the United States insisted that the decisions of the Court in McCulloch
and in Osborn v. Bank of the United States326 were not binding because
the Marshall Court’s reasoning was unpersuasive. Jackson thundered:
The opinion of the judges has no more authority over
Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the
judges, and on that point the President is independent
of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not,
therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the
Executive when acting in their legislative capacities,
but to have only such influence as the force of their
reasoning may deserve.327
Jackson’s argument renders nugatory any argument based simply on
judicial precedent. What precedent-based arguments do, he might
have pointed out, is bracket out of consideration substantive justice,
social consequences, or even fidelity to the Constitution in the name of
adherence to the “rule laid down.” Precedent, so understood, becomes
325

See James Madison, Veto Message, in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 484-85, 554-557 (James D. Richardson ed., Gov’t Printing
Off. 1896).
326
22 U.S. 738 (1824).
327
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 582 (James D. Richardson ed., Gov’t Printing Off. 1896).
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the formalism a constitutional decision-maker may wield against
morality. This was McLean’s position following Prigg.328 Stephen
Douglas made the same argument after Dred Scott. The Illinois
Democrat during his debates with Lincoln declared:
I am content to take [Dred Scott] as it stands, delivered
by the highest judicial tribunal on earth, a tribunal
established by the Constitution of the United States for
that purpose, and hence that decision becomes the law
of the land, binding on you, on me, and on every other
good citizen, whether we like it or not. 329
The highest constitutional duty, this quotation suggests, is to obey the
Supreme Court.
Lincoln, Webster, and their anti-slavery contemporaries had
several means for dissolving their moral-formal dilemma. They might
have insisted that a correct understanding of the Constitution
demonstrates how it forbade slavery, or at least forbade providing the
particular protection to slaveholding under consideration. Several
prominent “anti-slavery constitutionalists” made such arguments.330
St. Augustine, and many after him, maintained that positive law that
so obviously conflicts with “natural law” and “justice” is not really
“law” at all and should be disregarded. 331 Before the Civil War,
William Seward, the governor of New York who became Lincoln’s
Secretary of State, famously advocated submission to a “higher law”
than that of the Constitution. 332 Justice Samuel Chase, in Calder v.
Bull, declared that “[a]n ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a
law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” 333 Antislavery constitutional decision-makers might have paid more attention
to the injunction of the Preamble to “establish Justice” and “secure the
blessings of Liberty” as the central purposes of the Constitution when
328

See Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 340 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853).
Abraham Lincoln, Third Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Jonesboro, Illinois
(1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 102, 112 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
330
See COVER, supra note 1, at 154-58.
331
See Robert P. George, Justice, Legitimacy, and Allegiance: “The End of
Democracy” Symposium Revisited, 44 LOYOLA L. REV. 103, 106 (1998) (discussing
Augustine and the principle of “les iniusta non est lex”).
332
Congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., App., 265.
333
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (majority opinion).
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those grand injunctions collided with perceived needs to preserve the
Union or the generally understood meaning of particular constitutional
texts. Justice James Iredell thought he had refuted such recourses to
first principles and natural law in Calder,334 but such forms of
reasoning remained alive and well in the antislavery constitutionalism
of the antebellum United States.335
Lincoln, Webster, and Cover did not treat the Constitution as a
comedy with happy endings when interpreted correctly. Cover briefly
describes antislavery constitutionalists, such as Lysander Spooner, as
offering “utopian arguments.”336 Such antislavery constitutionalists
convinced no “mainstream” judges, lawyers able to gain both
presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation to the federal
bench, before whom they brought their claims.337 Most Republicans
were no more convinced, even as they thought the most extreme proslavery arguments mistaken. Before the Civil War, Lincoln insisted
that under the Constitution properly interpreted the United States could
still be a slaveholding country in 1960. 338 The system of compensated
emancipation scheme he endorsed in 1863 had 1900 as the date at
which slavery would finally disappear. 339 The Civil War brought forth
emancipation through slaughter. Constitutional and moral arguments
had little to do with the case.
IV.

THE MORAL-FORMAL DILEMMA, 2017-2021

Donald Trump’s presidency and the aftermath played new
variations on the moral-formal dilemma that antislavery Justices faced
before the Civil War and Justices committed to racial equality faced
during the Great Society. Donald Trump was widely acknowledged to
be uniquely unqualified to be President of the United States.340 This
334

Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
336
COVER, supra note 1.
337
See THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780-1861 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) (noting the widescale rejection
of claims by federal judges that the Fugitive Slave Acts were unconstitutional).
338
Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois
(1858), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 18 (Roy P. Basler ed.,
Rutgers Univ. Press 1953).
339
Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (1861), in 5 C OLLECTED WORKS
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 530 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953).
340
See Levinson & Graber, supra note 32, at 140-45.
335
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was not simply the sentiment of persons on the political left, who
would condemn any Republican. Almost the entire conservative
intelligentsia of 2015 repudiated Trump during his candidacy and
throughout his presidency. Consider the examples of Jennifer Rubin,
Max Boot, Michael Gerson, George Will, William Kristol, Ross
Douthat and Bret Stephens. 341 The Washington Post had to hire a new
columnist, Marc Thiessen, who had no previous reputation, just to find
a pundit who would praise Trump on a regular basis; a step the New
York Times, correctly in our judgment, refused to take. 342 Moral
considerations demanded that Trump’s power be minimized and he be
removed from power as soon as possible. 343 The only possible defense
of Trump’s power and continuation in office was that he was entitled
to the office as a matter of blackletter constitutional law.344 Formality
had to trump morality.
This moral-formal dilemma played out largely in Congress and
the elected branches of the national government. The Supreme Court
resolved a few issues, most notably the Muslim ban 345 and questions
341

See generally JENNIFER RUBIN, RESISTANCE: HOW WOMEN SAVED DEMOCRACY
DONALD TRUMP (Harper Collins 2021). See also Max Boot, How Can 42
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The Trump Nightmare Looms Again, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2021),
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/opinion/donald-trumppresidency.html.
343
Levinson & Graber, supra note 32, at 164-70.
344
See Josh Blackman, ‘Neutral Principles’ and the ‘Presumption of Regularity’ in
the
Era
of
Trump,
LAWFARE
(Sept.
7,
2017,
12:03
PM,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/neutral-principles-and-presumption-regularity-eratrump.
345
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (sustaining President Trump’s order
barring immigrants from primarily Muslim countries).
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concerning the 2020 census.346 Congress more regularly confronted
issues concerning whether to rein in or encourage presidential powers
or, more importantly, whether to remove Donald Trump from office. 347
The moral-formal dilemma had particular force during impeachment.
On one view, most famously championed by Sean Wilentz during the
Clinton impeachment, the decision to remove a President has
everything to do with law and nothing to do with fitness for office. 348
A President commits an impeachable crime only when what the
President has done satisfies a technical parsing of “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”349
On another view, “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” must be understood in ways that permit Americans to
remove a person from office who is demonstrably unfit to hold high
office.350 Just as Justice Story in Prigg insisted that the Constitution
compelled decisionmakers to treat a human fugitive from slavery as if
that person was a cow that wandered on to a neighbor’s property,351 so
Trump’s defenders insisted that members of Congress, when
considering the President’s Article II powers and impeachment
standards, treat Trump the same way they would treat George
Washington.
Donald Trump’s presidency compelled some Republicans to
acknowledge Brest’s call for conscientious legislators as they
struggled over whether to follow partisan or constitutional imperatives.
At the beginning of the congressional inquiry on July 27, 2021 that
investigated the circumstances surrounding the attack on the Capitol
on January 6 earlier in the year, Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney
declared:
I have been a conservative Republican since 1984 when
I first voted for Ronald Reagan. I have disagreed
sharply on policy and politics with almost every
Democratic member of this committee. But, in the end,
we are one nation under God. The Framers of our
See Dep’t Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (declaring illegal Trump
administrative efforts to ask certain questions about citizenship status on the 2020
national census).
347
See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 39, at 740-53.
348
See Sean Wilentz et al., Historians in Defense of the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1998, at A17.
349
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST
IMPEACHING TRUMP 143 (2019).
350
See generally ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHMENT (2018).
351
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625-26 (1842).
346
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Constitution recognized the danger of the vicious
factionalism of partisan politics -- and they knew that
our daily arguments could become so fierce that we
might lose track of our most important obligation -- to
defend the rule of law and the freedom of all
Americans. That is why our Framers compelled each of
us to swear a solemn oath to preserve and protect the
Constitution. When a threat to our constitutional order
arises, as it has here, we are obligated to rise above
politics.352
Utah Senator Mitt Romney spoke similarly when voting to convict
Donald J. Trump in February 2020 of the “high [c]rime and
[m]isdemeanor” for which he had been impeached by the House of
Representatives:
In the last several weeks, I have received numerous
calls and texts. Many demand that, in their words, “I
stand with the team.” I can assure you that that thought
has been very much on my mind. I support a great deal
of what the President has done. I have voted with him
80% of the time. But my promise before God to apply
impartial justice required that I put my personal feelings
and biases aside. Were I to ignore the evidence that has
been presented, and disregard what I believe my oath
and the Constitution demands of me for the sake of a
partisan end, it would, I fear, expose my character to
history’s rebuke and the censure of my own
conscience.353
Consistent with the sharp separation of law and politics in
contemporary literature, 354 we might treat Representative Cheney and
Senator Romney as engaged in mere posturing or, in what David
Mayhew called, “position-taking.”355 They speak to gain the
Liz Cheney’s Opening Statement Before The January 6 Select Committee, CNN
POL. (July 27, 2021, 11:53 AM), https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/27/politics/readcheney-statement/index.html.
353
Full Transcript: Mitt Romney’s Speech Announcing Vote to Convict Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/mittromney-impeachment-speech-transcript.html.
354
See Graber, supra note 180, at 110-17.
355
See DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 61-73 (Yale
Univ. Press 1974).
352
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appearance of a loyal public servant knowing that would do little to rid
the scourge of Donald Trump from American constitutional politics.
On another, we think better, view, Cheney and Romney are
demonstrating the importance of the oath and are examples of wouldbe “conscientious legislators.” They are serious and commendable
public servants engaged with the distinct form the moral-formal
dilemma is taking in the twenty-first century.
This contemporary moral-formal dilemma has a different
structure than the moral-formal dilemmas of the distant and recent
past. Moral-formal dilemmas of the present concern matters more
often taught in the first semester of constitutional law, which is
typically devoted to the structure and powers of government, than
matters more often taught in the second semester of constitutional law,
which is typically devoted to civil rights and liberties. Trump’s
presidency raised questions about executive powers, executive
privilege, and impeachment.356 Related moral-formal dilemmas in the
future will likely concern questions of constitutional adequacy, how
government responds to pandemics, and the threat of climate disaster,
which should balance moral and formal concerns when interpreting
constitutional powers and structures.
The moral-formal dilemmas of the present also concern a
political party that has, in the eyes of most commentators, gone off the
constitutional democracy rails. 357 The Republican Party’s adherence
to Donald Trump threatens constitutional democracy in the United
States. The Republican Party’s denial of modern science has
contributed to the loss of nearly one million U.S. lives during the
pandemic358 and threatens the United States, as well as the rest of the
world, with an environmental catastrophe that, if we are lucky, will
only kill untold millions of people and not become an extinction
event.359 These concerns raise moral-formal dilemmas in courts,
356

For a summary of those issues and relevant excerpts, see GILLMAN ET AL., supra
note 39, at 683-753.
357
See generally MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 33 (discussing how Republicans
have undermined congressional capacity to legislate responsibly).
358
See Jonathan Chait, Republican Vaccine Denial Is Not a Political Strategy, N.Y.
MAG. (Aug. 21, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/08/republicanvaccine-denial-is-not-a-political-strategy.htm.
359
See Paul Krugman, The Party That Ruined the Planet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/12/opinion/climate-changerepublicans.html (discussing the Republican party’s dangerous denial of climate
change).
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because we suspect a great many Republican judicial appointments are
aware that Trump’s Republican Party is a threat to constitutional
democracy, if not human existence. These concerns raise moralformal dilemmas outside of courts because we suspect a great many
Republican officeholders understand their party is moving in
directions that threaten constitutional democracy, if not human
existence.360 Nevertheless, on a formal reading of the Constitution, a
case can be made that all parties are created equal. Trump Republicans
in office have the same powers as Lincoln Republicans, Roosevelt
Democrats or, for that matter, Reagan Republicans, much as the two
of us strongly disagree with the constitutional vision offered by the
Reagan Administration. The survival of constitutional democracy in
the United States and the human race may depend on how governing
officials resolve this version of the moral-formal dilemma.
V.

JUDGES, CONSTITUTIONAL ACTORS, AND MORAL-FORMAL
DILEMMAS

Robert Cover attempted to “describe” the phenomenology of
judging in a regime that recognized the legality of slavery. Cover was
appalled by that regime, but he very carefully refrained from endorsing
the “utopian”361 arguments presented by Lysander Spooner362 or, later,
by Frederick Douglass.363 Justice Accused suggested that less formal,
more imaginative, arguments were available that might have tempered
Northern judicial acquiescence to the Slave Power 364; but, at no point
did Cover offer what he believed to be the “right” answer to the
constitutional questions raised by slavery or the moral questions raised
by judging in a regime that most people thought constitutionally
committed to offering some protections for human bondage. Cover
was far more interested in the personal psychology of the judges he
discusses than in the technical jurisprudential questions clearly evoked
in Justice Accused.365 Cover offers no extended discussion of such
360

See generally JEFF FLAKE, CONSCIENCE OF A CONSERVATIVE: A REJECTION OF
DESTRUCTIVE POLITICS AND A RETURN TO PRINCIPLE (Random House 2017).
361
COVER, supra note 1, at 154.
362
See generally LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY,
BELA MARSH (1860).
363
Frederick Douglass, Lecture Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland, Unconstitutionality
of Slavery (Mar. 26, 1860).
364
COVER, supra note 1, at 33-116, 155-56.
365
Id. at 226-59.
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figures as H.L.A. Hart, Lon Fuller, or Ronald Dworkin, who were,
during the 1960s, carrying on a furious debate about the limits of a
positivist analysis of law. 366 Readers more concerned with solutions
to the moral-formal dilemma than with the mental states of those who
experience that phenomenon might turn to David Dyzenhaus, whose
discussion of pre-1994 South Africa offers a very close jurisprudential
analysis of what he calls Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems.367
If Robert Cover was still alive to write a second edition of his
brilliant and path-breaking book, he might consider the monumental
issues raised by the magnificent statue of Joseph Story carved by his
son, William Wentworth Story, that is the first thing one sees on
ascending the steps to the Harvard Law School Library. The State of
Maryland has removed various monuments honoring native son, Roger
Brooke Taney, because of the stigma attached to Taney’s authorship
of Dred Scott.368 Prigg is no better, and arguably worse.369 Once we
remove the monument to Story, is the next step renaming Webster
Hall, which is at the center of Dartmouth College? Does the Lincoln
Memorial survive this scrutiny? Would Cover think these questions
worth the attention of the legal academy? Would Justice Accused II
explicitly or implicitly treat these questions as invoking what Lincoln,
in the First Inaugural, called “[t]he mystic chords of memory” 370 that
ostensibly bind Americans together as a subject on which lawyers and
law professors have no more to say than other citizens?
The second edition of Justice Accused might include a chapter
addressing the constitutional duties attached to all public officials.
Alas, Cover’s hypothetical discussion of the antebellum moral-formal
366

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 54-64 (2d. ed. 1978). See
generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). For an excellent summary of that
debate, see generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Practical Positivism Versus Practical
Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1170 (2008).
367
See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS:
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991).
368
See Maryland Removes Controversial Roger Taney Statue From State House
Grounds,
CBS
NEWS
(Aug.
18,
2017,
5:28
AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/maryland-removes-controversial-roger-taneystatue-from-state-house-grounds.
369
See Sanford Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? Why
Prigg is Worse than Dred Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “AntiCanon”), 125
HARV. L. REV. F. 23, 23-32 (2011).
370
Lincoln, supra note 304, at 271.
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dilemma as experienced by members of the legislative and executive
branches of the national government might have centered on Webster,
Lincoln, and other antislavery governing officials who, to preserve the
Union, made one compromise after another with the “peculiar
institution.” Readers would see in that discussion references to those
governing officials and judges who had to decide whether to obey what
they thought was the letter of the law when carrying out the pernicious
commands of Donald Trump. We terribly miss that second edition,
not least because both of us, and we suspect the legal academy as a
whole, would love to know where Cover would come out on the
tortuous questions that he identified for an earlier generation that very
much remain with us today.
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